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ABSTRACT 
This participant observer case study examines a new university institute that was established 
in 2007 to advance IT research and commercialization and to bridge the valley of death, a 
metaphor often used to describe the gap between university research and its 
commercialization. Using cluster analysis, this case study draws on Burke and Bourdieu to 
analyze the ways that rhetorical figures function to stabilize technology transfer by providing 
a framework for measuring its value and success. At the same time, that framework is always 
being constituted and is always contested. One key finding was a tension between a 
traditional Mode 1 conception of research and a more entrepreneurial Mode 2 conception, in 
which knowledge production is diffuse, crossing disciplinary and university boundaries. This 
case study highlights important trends in technology transfer, specifically in how university 
research is valued and success is defined by various stakeholders. 
 
 
 1
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary discussions about technology transfer often hover around the tension 
between the traditional public role of the university and a more entrepreneurial one 
characterized by partnerships with industry. Many argue these partnerships are necessary not 
only to fund costly research programs, but also to stay competitive in a global economy. But 
others criticize these partnerships, saying such deals compromise academic freedom and 
remove knowledge from the public domain. One of the central issues in this division is the 
ways in which research is valued, whether as a public good or as a tool for economic 
development. Recently, the U.S. Department of Commerce (2008) and the National Science 
Foundation (2008a) called for new models to quantify the impact of the sciences and 
technological innovation on the U.S. economy. How do we measure the success of research 
programs, traditional or otherwise? As Mirowski and Sent (2002) argued, the answer to that 
question has often ignored the social structures of doing science in geographic, historical and 
economic contexts (p. 11). Many of these models also ignore language, or the rhetorical key 
figures, that give those models structure and meaning. 
In studying technology transfer, I have long been interested in the rhetoric of 
technology transfer as economic development and the rhetorical figures that give that 
discourse meaning and structure. As Burke (1966) said, the terminology used in a discourse 
is a reflection, selection, and deflection of reality. “In brief, much that we take as 
observations about ‘reality’ may be but the spinning out of possibilities implicit in our 
particular choice of terms” (Burke, 1966, p. 46). Rhetorical analysis makes explicit the 
implicit assumptions and arguments of a given terminology. My question is what are the 
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assumptions and arguments that position technology transfer as economic development 
especially in relation to traditional narratives about science and technology?  
This question is of increasing importance in a technological age when the 
complexities of today’s problems require a critical perspective about technological systems 
as a discourse with social, political, and economic dimensions. From the classical period to 
the present, the rhetorical tradition has been one of theories about language and the 
persuasive strategies involved in communicating complex knowledge to general or other 
specialized audiences. In technology transfer, the calls for new models to assess the impact of 
university research also means examining the arguments that underscore the model and the 
ways those arguments are authorized. This dissertation takes the position that technology 
transfer as economic development generates a different rhetorical ground for action than do 
traditional models that privilege the public good. 
In this chapter, I outline this tension in technology transfer by analyzing a metaphor 
often used to describe the state of university research—the valley of death. As Coppola 
(2007) stated, technology transfer is often conceptualized in terms of barriers and bridges to 
success. And, although Coppola (2007) argued that the field needed a new metaphor to 
conceptualize the practice, these metaphors say a great deal about the context within which 
technology transfer is practiced.  
The Valley of Death: A Gap Between Discovery & Application 
In technology transfer, the “valley of death” is the metaphor often used to describe 
the gap between academic-based innovations and their commercial application in the 
marketplace. Although traditional definitions of technology transfer often assume a smooth 
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shift of intellectual property from university (or private) research laboratories to private or 
publicly held companies that commercially develop the technology, the valley of death 
suggests that the practice is anything but smooth. In fact, this rather grim metaphor implies 
that academic research is in some way cut off from the outside world. So why the valley of 
death and how do we get around it? These questions have taken on more urgency as funding 
agencies, ranging from the National Science Board to state governments, have increased 
pressure on university leaders to partner with industry, seeing technology transfer as integral 
to local economic development. As Cohen (2006) explained:  
Communities are increasingly looking to their regional governments and 
universities to implement programs that stimulate the local economy. This 
community expectation is especially vocal when regions are trying to 
overcome an economic downturn (e.g. the post dot-com bust), or stimulate a 
particularly promising industry (e.g. nanotechnology). In response to these 
heightened outcries, government leaders eagerly assemble a plan 
corresponding to taxpayer-derived funding. Leveraging universities is 
frequently a key component of this solution (p. 27). 
Although this idea of university research contributing to economic progress and public well-
being is not necessarily new, its explicit connection to economic development is, signaling a 
change in the discourse about the systems and rules for managing science. As Mirowski and 
Sent (2002) said, “something rather drastic and profound has been happening to the social 
organization of science in America and Europe at the end of this century” (p. 3). In light of a 
newly globalized economy, those sweeping changes have a lot to do with accountability and 
impact of public funds. 
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But what precipitated those changes? Mirowski and Sent (2002) proposed three 
historical phases to describe science organization and funding in the United States, arguing 
that “each regime comprised a distinct set of structures that have in practice summoned quite 
differing versions of an ‘economics of science’ to justify and account for their regularities” 
(p. 12). The divisions are:  
1. The protoindustrial regime (early 20th century to 1940), during which college and 
universities were organized primarily as an educational service; at this time, the 
U.S. federal government supported research through agricultural extension 
programs, what Miller (unpublished) identified as the “earliest systematic 
program of technology transfer” (p. 7).  
2. The Cold War regime (World War II through the Cold War), during which federal 
policy and its support of research in the sciences and technology “created a 
situation in which teaching was now openly avowed to be complementary to 
research” (Mirowski and Sent, 2002, p. 18). 
3. The globalized privatization regime (roughly the 1980s to the present), an era of 
shrinking federal budgets and changing policies regarding the expectations of 
individual faculty.  
Each of these regimes are structured by routines, practices, and language that account for 
what researchers do on a day-to-day basis and the ways in which those activities are valued. 
The distinctions among these practices have also been defined under what were first 
coined by Gibbons et al. (1994) as a Mode 1/Mode 2 framework for the sets of practices that 
characterize research. As defined by Gibbons et al. (1994), these modes do not represent a 
watershed moment in the history of science funding, but rather name a tension that describes 
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the structures of science and technology in an era of globalized privatization. According to 
Gibbons et al. (1994), “Mode 1 is discipline-based and carries a distinction between what is 
fundamental and what is applied; this implies an operational distinction between a theoretical 
core and other areas of knowledge such as the engineering sciences, where the theoretical 
insights are translated into applications” (p. 19). Under this mode, the research model is a 
linear one, in which knowledge “moves” from a disciplinary boundary out to a destination. 
By contrast, Mode 2 knowledge production is characterized by a diffuse trans-disciplinarity: 
“scientific, technological, and industrial knowledge production are becoming more closely 
connected,” resulting in open structures that blur distinctions not only among disciplines, but 
in what constitutes basic versus applied research (Gibbons, 1994, p. 48). In effect, this 
diffuse trans-disciplinarity disrupts the linear research model and its traditional categories 
and boundaries for what counts as knowledge production.  
Furthermore, each of these modes has its own rules for what constitutes knowledge as 
wealth. One question that continually resurfaces in discussions about Mode 1/Mode 2 is the 
value of research. How are value and success defined in the new mode when its creation is 
de-centralized? In Mode 1, research proceeded under what Merton (1973) called the values 
of communalism, in which research is sanctioned and legitimized by the disciplinary 
community through its professional institutions (such as university departments, disciplinary 
journals, and professional meetings). Part of this value is constituted by the “disinterested” 
character of the scientist, which “equates scientists’ self-interest with the public interest to 
ensure that research contributes to the public good of expanding knowledge rather than to a 
narrower personal interest” (Lieberwitz, 2007, p. 56). Because narrower personal interests 
may have undue influence on the direction the research takes, the more disinterested, or what 
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Anthony Giddens (1990) called “disembedded,” the research is from its context, the more 
value it has as a public good. Because it was “made” outside of, and is therefore detached 
from, material interests, the knowledge is not tainted by those interests. It is pure.  
But, how does this detachment work? As Giddens (1990) defined it, disembedding 
means “‘lifting out’ of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their 
restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space” (p. 21). It means erasing the traces of 
production. Giddens (1990) named two mechanisms for doing so: creating symbolic tokens 
and establishing expert systems (p. 22) or “systems of technical accomplishment or 
professional expertise that organize large areas of the material and social environments in 
which we live today” (p. 27). Furthermore, this “lifting out” of the local context, out of time 
and place, relies on abstract concepts, such as the public good, to organize the activity and 
practices taking place on the ground. In the case of technology transfer, these abstract 
concepts, or key terms, provide markers for defining the practices that are valued within that 
system.  
For instance, the “disinterested scientist” took on value during the Cold War era of 
science funding and policies, which was marked by substantial federal presence in managing 
and financing academic science, by the large-scale development of Big Science and by the 
ideology of academic freedom—scientists needed to set their own research agendas outside 
of industrial interests (Mirowski and Sent, 2002, p. 20). The idea that scientists as experts 
required “disinterested” funds can be traced to Vannevar Bush’s Science: The Endless 
Frontier (1945). In his report to President Truman, he justified his recommendation to create 
a new governmental agency to fund long-range research programs by saying “the rewards of 
such exploration both for the Nation and the individual are great. Scientific progress is one 
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essential key to our security as a nation, to our better health, to more jobs, to a higher 
standard of living, and to our cultural progress” (p. vi). In the aftermath of WWII, this line of 
reasoning linked the need for renewed scientific talent and resources to progress and moving 
the nation forward.  
But the justification also relied on solidifying the scientific community as an expert 
system: “Scientific progress on a broad front results from the free play of free intellects, 
working on subjects of their own choice, in the manner dictated by their curiosity for the 
unknown. Freedom of inquiry must be preserved under any plan for Government support of 
science” (Bush, 1945, p. 7). In other words, the scientific community needed to be left alone 
to do their work in the interests of the country. By privileging the sanctity of the research 
community, accountability is then couched in terms of scientific progress for the benefit of 
all—the public good, an abstract concept that transforms the institutional structure of the 
university from its pre-war service orientation to a post-war research orientation. It can do so, 
as Giddens (1990) explained, because the practice is disembedded from its context, serving 
“to open up manifold possibilities of change by breaking free from the restraints of local 
habits and practices” (p. 20). Additionally, it provides what he called “the gearing 
mechanisms” of modern organizations, giving them a dynamism for mapping local concerns 
on a globalized terrain. Concepts, such as the public good, “actively constitute what that 
behaviour is and inform the reasons for which it is undertaken” (Giddens, 1990, p. 41). In 
Burkean terms, it is “language as symbolic action” (1966, p. 44). Transformation happens via 
a common ground, in which key terms organize and generate systems and structures for its 
underlying activity.  
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But such transformation also relies on trust in the experts and the expert system 
engaged. Trust, as Giddens (1990) argued, “is much less of a ‘leap to commitment’ than a 
tacit acceptance of circumstances in which other alternatives are largely foreclosed” (p. 90). 
In technology transfer, that tacit acceptance of the model that accounted for the value of basic 
research began to erode in the 1980s. With falling productivity and stagnant economic 
growth in a newly globalized competitive environment, many began to question the efficacy 
of funding university research. As Kozmetsky (1990) characterized the situation, the 
traditional paradigm—in which industry concentrates on production and universities on basic 
research—failed to develop, commercialize, and diffuse technologies fast enough to sustain 
economic growth (p. 27). Mirowski and Sent (2002) called the separation of basic from 
applied science a “convenient fiction” that could not long be maintained in a changing 
economic climate (p. 23). Gibbons et al. (1994) pointed to an educated public that demanded 
accountability of public funding in light of several techno-science failures. In short, the value 
of research as a public good was held up for question. 
The Valley of Death: A Rhetorical Divide 
The power of these abstract concepts has to do with the continual negotiation and 
revision of their meaning. Although the valley of death suggests that technology transfer is 
about moving ideas from one entity to the next, technology transfer is about people in 
relationships. As Stephen Doheny Farina (1992) and later Nancy Coppola (2007) argued, 
technology transfer is about relationships and collaboration among individuals and groups 
(industry, government, and academia) with varied interests.  
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That is at their core these processes involve individuals and groups 
negotiating their visions of technologies and applications, markets and users 
in what they all hope is a common enterprise. This means that the reality of a 
transfer does not exist apart from the perceptions of the participants. Instead, 
the reality—what the transfer means to the participants—is the result of 
continual conceptualizing, negotiating, and reconceptualizing (Doheny-Farina, 
1992, p. 4).  
In Mode 1, the negotiated vision of technology transfer relied on a movement from basic to 
applied results, from expert systems to the public good. As a linear model, this 
conceptualization misrecognizes meaning as a transferable. Rather, meaning is always 
negotiated, always rhetorical. 
But Mode 2 is also always negotiated, always rhetorical. To understand what 
constitutes its success means looking at the practice as it is made by its participants. This 
conception of technology transfer follows a definition of rhetoric as language mediating 
action: language organizes and generates reality (a provisional one) by providing a “ground” 
for taking action. This dramatistic view of language situates agents, their agency, and their 
motivation to act within context and structures. Following Burke, this “grounding” of action 
is dialectical in that one element defines the other. Burke (1969a) likened this dialectical 
relationship to an alchemic transmutation, in which the molten center is made and remade as 
various elements combine and congeal to make new forms (p. xix). This idea extends to the 
admixture and transmutation of Mode 1/Mode 2 knowledge production and the ways that 
each is enacted and transformed in relation to the other. As Bourdieu (1998) argued, value is 
constituted in the gap or difference between such categories: “when perceived through these 
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social categories of perception, these principles of vision and division, the differences in 
practices, in the goods possessed, or in the opinions expressed become symbolic differences 
and constitute a veritable language” (p. 8). As Bourdieu argued, linguistic competence is a 
kind of capital that can be exchanged for other types of capital, including monetary funds. 
To explore how language constitutes value in technology transfers, I observed the 
Information Technology Institute1 (ITI), which was established by Iowa State University’s 
(ISU) Board of Regents in May 2007 as a mechanism to bring together researchers, industry 
leaders and entrepreneurs, “pledging to turn a $1 million state investment into six new 
companies, three new industrial collaborations and a 40 percent jump in research funding” 
(Geoffroy, 2007). This pledge reflects a changing economic structure for organizing 
scientific research as profit centers that can generate intellectual property. In its own 
organization, however, the ITI experienced a lengthy and somewhat contentious definitional 
period. In the time that I observed the organization, its core members faced these challenges:  
• Defining the organization’s mission and vision 
• Instituting policies and procedures that met the needs of the university, the 
industrial partners, and other stakeholders 
• Articulating the value of the organization to various stakeholders at an early stage 
of development, including university administrators as well as potential industry 
partners.  
Although the ITI is a localized example, the problems it faced reflect larger issues in 
technology transfer as the practice is “grounded” by people with competing ideas over the 
                                                
1Names of the organizations and the people involved have been changed. 
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value of research, working within organizational structures that both constrain and enable 
their actions. Although the linkages between technology transfer and economic development 
may seem logical and obvious, the valley of death continues to threaten organizations, 
including the ITI, as these various groups of people with diverse interests struggle to define a 
common ground that is mutually beneficial. 
To analyze the ways in which that common ground is constituted by its participants, 
these questions guided my research and analysis: 
1. What rhetorical devices are used to represent technology transfer to various 
stakeholders?   
2. What role does ethos and representation of the organization play in defining the 
value and success of technology transfer? In other words, how does the 
organization represent its value and success?  
3. How does audience affect the ways in which technological discourse is negotiated 
in public and private spheres, which is also to ask, how is the organization’s 
identity tied to other definitions of success and value in technology transfer? 
In asking these questions, I was interested in the ways that ITI defined technology transfer, 
the places those definitions were contested and negotiated, and the language used to define 
its value and success to argue that technology transfer is constituted as a situated practice. As 
such, key terms, such as the public good and economic development, work to stabilize the 
activity by providing a framework for measuring its value and success. At the same time, that 
framework is always being constituted and is always contested. As Burke pointed out, the 
power of language and metaphor comes from the underlying conceptions of what it is not. It 
is in these ambiguities that concepts, such as technology transfer as economic development, 
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are both stabilized and uncertain—stable in that we can measure the value of an idea, 
uncertain because that measurement is always being constituted and is always contested. 
The ways in which this discourse is constituted can also say something about our own 
agency when it comes to technological systems. As these systems get more complicated, 
there is often the sense that the systems have moved beyond our control. For instance, Dewey 
(1991), Heidegger (1977), and Borgmann (1999) all worried over a loss of agency and 
engagement in technological systems that are increasingly embedded in our day-to-day lives. 
When expert systems are so technologically sophisticated that they challenge the layperson’s 
ability to make decisions about the best route of action, who or what serves as the rhetorical 
ground for public deliberations about technological advances? Whose values are articulated 
in technology transfer as economic development? The results of this dissertation can lead to a 
critical discussion about our conceptual models for engaging in discussions about the 
development of new technologies. 
In the chapters that follow, I address these questions. In Chapter 2, I provide a fuller 
account of the historical background in technology transfer, review current literature, and 
outline a theoretical framework that draws on Kenneth Burke and Pierre Bourdieu. In 
Chapter 3, I describe the methodology that framed my observations and analysis. Chapter 4 is 
a written account of my research and study of the Information Technology Institute. Finally, I 
conclude in Chapter 5 by suggesting that even though the ITI is but one case, the challenges 
it faced in defining its mission and articulating its vision represent larger trends in technology 
transfer.  
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
As a metaphor, the valley of death suggests that the path between academic 
innovation and its commercial application is a perilous and life threatening one at best. 
Indeed, regardless of its merit, an innovation’s success is never certain—many obstacles, 
including monetary resources, can stand in the way. But for public universities, the problems 
associated with the valley of death are compounded by the need to account for publicly 
funded R & D in academic sciences and engineering and to justify why those funds are 
necessary. In Chapter 1, I argued that terms, such as economic development, provide a 
framework for defining the value of success, stabilizing the uncertainties inherent in 
technology transfer as a practice. At the same time, that framework is always unstable as 
various interests compete to define the markers that are valued in the discourse. 
In this chapter, I further develop that argument by examining the rhetorical ground in 
which a vision of technology transfer is negotiated and applied in a field of competing 
interests and motives. In doing so, I am interested in the use of rhetorical figures to constitute 
meaning and configure relationships and interests. As many have argued, technology transfer 
is not so much about moving ideas as it is about connecting interests: “That is, at their core 
these processes involve individuals and groups negotiating their visions of technologies and 
applications, markets and users in what they all hope is a common enterprise” (Doheny-
Farina, 1992, p. 4). Technology transfer is a highly sophisticated rhetorical activity.  
But since Doheny-Farina’s (1992), Rhetoric, Innovation, and Technology very little 
has been done to consider the rhetoric of technology transfer as an activity that is 
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continuously interpreted, negotiated, and re-negotiated by all the participants involved. In the 
current literature on technology transfer, these trends stand out:  
• Models of technology transfer are often conceptualized as linear, point-to-point 
processes. 
• Studies fail to broadly conceive characterizations of technology transfer’s success 
and value beyond the immediate participants—as a public good or as economic 
development. 
• Few studies consider the language or key figures used to organize technology 
transfer discourse. 
In this dissertation, I extend Doheny-Farina’s conception of technology transfer by looking at 
the ways in which key terms, such as the public good and economic development, direct, 
deflect, and reflect attention in the discourse. Following Burke’s ideas about terministic 
screens, terminology not only grounds the discourse, but it also reflects common interests or 
what Burke called consubstantiation. To move discussions about technology transfer forward 
means looking at how it is rhetorically figured, particularly in relation to the need to define 
models of success and the problem of who or what authorizes such criteria.  
As I discussed in Chapter 1, ITI’s university research directors could not agree on the 
organization’s mission—what was at stake were differences in the model of success, between 
what Gibbons et al. (1994) called Mode 1 and Mode 2 knowledge production. In other words, 
ITI brought to the fore a clash of cultures between a research tradition that values the 
autonomy of the scientific community and a more entrepreneurial mode that includes “a 
wider, more temporary and heterogeneous set of practitioners, collaborating on problems 
defined in a specific and localized context” (Gibbons et al., 1994 p. 3). This new mode re-
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conceptualizes knowledge not as a product or thing that moves from one locality to another, 
but as socially distributed across networks. Although one mode does not cancel out the other, 
they are seen as competing practices. In his discussion of the contrasting mentalities, Fuller 
(2006) succinctly identified the place of contention with the question, “to whom are you 
ultimately accountable for the quality of your research?” (p. 77). Practitioners in both modes 
are competing to define that accountability, each mapping out different definitions of 
technology transfer. 
My project is to understand that map by analyzing the rhetorical figures that give the 
discourse shape and configure sets of relationships for who and what counts as research. In 
this chapter, I examine the ways that representations of technology transfer are used to create 
meaning, value, and presence by organizations such as ITI. In doing so, I am interested in 
how economic development is figured in technology transfer and what those configurations 
mean for the public good. As an interpretive and critical strategy, Burke’s method gives us a 
way to analyze these terms and their corresponding meaning and value as a discursive 
system. In the sections that follow, I situate ITI in an historical framework, discuss the 
limitations of hierarchical models of technology transfer, examine the concept of rhetorical 
figuration, and provide a Burkean framework for analysis. 
Historical Background 
Established in 2007, the ITI was created to bring together interdisciplinary faculty 
with industry leaders as a way to broaden the scope of research projects and to foster 
economic growth in the state. In many ways, ITI positioned itself as a response to the valley 
of death and current trends in funding academic science and engineering R&D. For one, 
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federal support for such research was in decline. In their Survey of Research and 
Development Expenditures at Universities and Colleges, the NSF found that in fiscal years 
2006 and 2007 federal funding for such research failed to keep up with inflation (Britt, 2008, 
p. 1). These declines stood in stark contrast to the fairly consistent increases from 1972–2000 
even after adjusting for inflation (NSF, 2008b, p. 5-5).  
Furthermore, although the federal government has remained the largest source of 
funds for academic R&D, its share of the total has decreased, dropping from 64 percent in 
fiscal year 2005 to 62 percent in fiscal year 2007 (Britt, 2008, p. 1). As the NSF found, 
although the federal government’s share of the pie has increased significantly since 2000 
when it provided 58 percent of the total, its share remains less than the 68 percent it provided 
in 1972 (NSF, 2008b, p. 5-5). Most interesting about NSF’s data, however, are those figures 
about nonfederal funding sources, which grew by 7.8 percent (or 5 percent in inflation-
adjusted terms) in fiscal year 2007. Most notable of these increases are industry’s share of the 
total. In 2007, industry funding grew by 11.2 percent (Britt, 2008, p. 2), reversing three years 
of steady decline between 2001 and 2004. Despite these fluctuations, however, the overall 
trend for R&D has been one of general continuous growth in total funding and in share of 
support from the federal government and private industry. R&D Magazine called it a 
“monotonic trend” with “periods of retrenchment and readjustment, but always with the 
overriding pattern of general expansion” (Duga et al., 2008, p. 5). 
In late 2008, even against a worldwide economic recession, R&D Magazine projected 
continued growth in its annual “Global R&D Funding Forecast.” But they were also quick to 
point to the “changing face of U.S. R&D” (Duga et al., 2008, p. 10), which complicated the 
projections they could make. Despite the stability and inertia of a well-established R&D 
 17
system, a “whole new generic set of actors” was creating rapid change (Duga et al., 2008, p. 
4). In the past, their projections benefited from the relatively constant sources of research 
funds and types of research-performing institutions. But, increases in U.S. foreign 
outsourcing, increased foreign investment, and changes in the areas of technology pursued all 
contributed to a new instability that was difficult to gauge given the lack of historic data.  
Against this backdrop of uncertainty, the ITI was also established in a culture of 
innovation, in which the idea that technology “drives” the economy was deeply embedded in 
the discourse—both in the popular press and in academic journals. For instance, in its 
September 22, 2008 issue, Business Week claimed that against the pessimism of America’s 
future, “economists and business leaders across the political spectrum are slowly coming to 
an agreement: Innovation is the best—and maybe the only—way the U.S. can get out of its 
economic hole” (Mandel, 2008, p. 52). Their question: How can smart ideas generate jobs 
and growth, keeping the U.S. competitive in a global marketplace? They concluded that 
throwing money at the problem was simply not enough. Rather what had to change were the 
ways Americans conceptualized the R&D process, recommending among other strategies 
that university and industry leaders step up their partnership efforts. 
In academic circles, similar conversations were taking place. Scholars including Crow 
& Silver (2008) positioned this link between innovation and economic growth as a recent 
phenomenon, emerging over the last fifty years, and argued for new educational policies to 
respond to this demand (p. 290). Similarly, Lane (2008) argued that future federal 
expenditures on science and engineering research are going to be a major policy issue, 
cautioning that these research programs will be negatively impacted “unless new arguments 
can be made for favored treatment of R&D funds and new ways are found to deploy those 
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funds more efficiently” (p. 261). In 2008, the statement that innovation drives the economy 
was punctuated by questions surrounding current policies and practices for sustaining R&D 
networks in a globally competitive environment and the need to respond to a changing 
landscape for doing business. 
However, questions about policies and practices in technology transfer are part of an 
extended conversation that dates prior to World War II. As early as the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, technology transfer as a practice began to take shape in the agricultural 
experiment stations attached to land-grant colleges. Supported by state governments, 
university-based extension agents were sent out to work directly with farmers to diffuse 
information. Then, in 1914, with the Smith-Lever Act, federal dollars were added to those 
state and local funds to create an agricultural extension system. But as Alic (2008) found, the 
extension service was a response to a social problem, not a technological one. The objective 
was to raise the standard of living for farm families, many of whom lived in poverty and 
isolation without a network to learn about new innovations (p. 18). In their role, extension 
agents were teachers, demonstrating new techniques for working with livestock and crops. In 
this capacity, extension agents responded to local conditions, using innovation to solve 
practical problems in the field. 
In general, around the turn of the 20th century, American research in the sciences and 
technology was relatively modest in scope. Outside of the extension services, universities 
received virtually no federal funding for research (Atkinson & Blanpied, 2008, p. 35). As 
Mirowski and Sent (2002) pointed out, Americans were skeptical of funding a scientific elite, 
regarding them as self-interested agents who could not be trusted to work on their behalf (p. 
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14–15). At this time, even with the extension services as an example, public funding for 
research was simply too radical of an idea.  
Rather, the concentration of research resided in a few large corporations such as 
General Electric and American Telephone & Telegraph, which employed scientists and 
engineers mainly to protect the company’s standing and investments. As Reich (1985) 
explained, teams of researchers, who had little freedom over scope and nature of the work, 
toiled in an atmosphere of “rules, regulations, and red tape” with the expectation of 
producing a steady stream of results (p. 8). As a result, research directors tended to favor low 
risk projects that promised applicable results in the short term. In this scenario, science was 
driven more by maintaining a company’s market share than by groundbreaking discoveries. 
Defined by industry leaders and their managers, scientific research was about protecting the 
company’s bottom line. 
That balance of scientific authority began to change after the Second World War, 
moving from largely corporate sites to university and federally-sponsored research labs. 
Following the war, the federal government took on a massive role in the funding and 
management of scientific research. During the war, the U.S. saw the power of science and 
engineering R&D in advances such as “radar, sonar, the proximity fuse, early computers, 
synthetic rubber, penicillin, sulfa drugs and other important innovations that contributed to 
the nation’s successful wartime effort” (Lane, 2008, p. 248). These innovations also included 
the Manhattan Project and MIT’s Rad Lab, federally funded research projects in which high 
risk paid off in high returns. 
These wartime successes afforded a cadre of scientists the means to argue for further 
federal support of research projects aimed at discovery, not corporate interest. In Science: 
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The Endless Frontier, Vannevar Bush (1945), then director of the Office of Scientific 
Research and Development and advisor to Roosevelt and Truman, argued that given the 
importance of innovation to the successes of the wartime effort, federal funding of “basic” 
research was essential to the nation’s security and well-being, recommending that the 
research be located in universities and federal labs. This move not only helped to establish 
scientific authority in the university, it also institutionalized “big science” and “big 
technology” as systems of practice underwritten as a public good for the benefit of society. 
As many have argued, Bush’s publication marked the beginning of an unwritten 
contract between academic scientists and the government; in exchange for government funds, 
academic scientists “discovered” the knowledge needed for the nation’s peace and prosperity. 
That knowledge became available primarily through publication in academic journals. The 
cornerstone of this narrative was a distinction between basic and applied science, two new 
categories that helped justify a substantial federal presence in science policy and planning. 
The result was a linear model for R&D in which knowledge moved from the source of 
discovery to an applied destination. According to Mirowski and Sent (2002), the linear model 
works in the following progression ( p. 22):  
“basic” science   “applied” science   “development”   production  
In this model, scientists discover “basic” knowledge, which is then recorded as facts to be 
applied in other contexts. “Basic” in this sense meant “pure” research. Not being tied to 
corporate interests, scientists could pursue fundamental knowledge. Lab technicians 
“applied” those fundamentals, which were then “developed” by industry.  
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In this conceptualization, scientists were recast as disinterested, unencumbered by 
bottom-line politics of the corporate world. In making his argument, Bush (1945) claimed 
scientists had to be left alone to “win the Cold War” and the “fight against disease.” In other 
words, for peace and prosperity, scientists needed academic freedom to pursue research 
agendas defined by the scientific community rather than by industry leaders. In effect, this 
interpretation helped to institutionalize authority in the academy, creating boundaries around 
what counted as research problems and who got to solve them.  
But this move was a rhetorical style described by Gieryn (1983) as boundary work, 
“in which scientists describe science for the public and its political authorities, sometimes 
hoping to enlarge the material and symbolic resources of scientists or to defend professional 
autonomy” (p. 782). In other words, science as a public good created a narrative around 
opposing categories that defined the boundaries of the activity: experts and non-experts, 
“basic” and “applied” research, theory and practice, and “disinterested” and “interested” 
scientists. Following World War II, this new hierarchy worked well in the light of protecting 
national interests, particularly military ones, from the threats of the Soviet Union and its 
allies. But with the end of the Cold War, one of this model’s key structural concepts—
academic freedom—came under attack: “the academic freedom defense of self-directed 
inquiry grew to sound increasingly like an exorbitant luxury, if not a hollow catechism” 
(Mirowski & Sent, 2002, p. 30). With the justification to win the Cold War removed, the 
boundaries and distinctions surrounding science as a public good became difficult to 
maintain. The question is why. 
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Technology Transfer: Hierarchical Models 
As a rhetorical move, the new narrative that privileged “basic” science as the starting 
point for knowledge production also helped to establish scientific authority in the university. 
While that category worked to professionalize a scientific community, it also created a 
technical sphere that stood apart from the public, making knowledge an output or thing that 
ended in public consumption—a trickle-down model of economics. But this model, based on 
the idea of supply and demand, is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it established an 
expert community. On the other hand, when that expert community failed to provide the 
output deemed sufficient for the input, it lost authority with a dissatisfied public sphere.  
In many ways, technology transfer is a by-product of this narrative. Although 
scholarly interest in the transfer of technology began in WWII with the connections between 
science, technology, and the military, the term was not actually used until the 1960s. As 
Carolyn Miller (unpublished) found, federal programs in the early 1960s were not talked 
about or promoted in terms of technology transfer (pgs. 8–9). Rather that term arose out of 
the need to show that publicly-funded research had a public benefit, “specifically in the 
weakening of the postwar consensus about the federal government’s role in supporting 
R&D” (Miller, unpublished, p. 5). A sluggish national economy provided an opening for 
public questions about whether the massive federal expenditures in basic science were 
creating the social benefits that Bush had promised in 1945.  
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, another narrative began to emerge, one that began 
to pay attention to the demand side of the economic equation. Traditional justifications for 
Mode 1 research based on peace and prosperity began to give way to a “cooperate to 
compete” narrative that encompassed the needs of business and industry. That need was for 
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research that had value now, rather than somewhere down the road. In the technology 
transfer literature in the late 1980s, many scholars began to question whether the traditional 
paradigm, in which universities concentrate on basic research and industry on production, 
made sense. As Kozmetsky (1990) argued, “technology innovation is taking on an ever-
increasing importance for setting our future domestic economic course as well as establishing 
the nature of U.S. world economic leadership” (p. 22). In a globalized marketplace, 
knowledge production was increasingly recognized as diffuse, disparate, and intricate in 
composition. But, the traditional paradigm failed to develop, commercialize, and diffuse 
technologies fast enough to sustain economic growth (Kozmetsky, p. 27).  
What Kozmetsky (1990) was talking about was the valley of death. Conceptually, the 
linear model that justified Mode 1 practices creates a gap between the technological and 
public spheres. In their work, Williams and Gibson (1990) identified three models that have 
characterized the ways in which that gap is bridged:  
• Appropriability – The quality of the research defines the movement of ideas to the 
marketplace. The metaphor in this model is the “better mousetrap”—in other 
words, good technologies sell themselves.  
• Dissemination – The expert informs willing users, who automatically adopt new 
technologies: “the new technology will flow from the expert to the nonexpert 
much like water through a pipe once the channel is opened” (Williams & Gibson, 
1990, p. 15).  
• Knowledge utilization – Both parties identify the facilitators and barriers to the 
transfer, valuing interpersonal communication between researchers and clients. 
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Underlying each of these models is the assumption that technology transfer is the result of an 
automatic process: knowledge moves from one location to the next, from the scientist to the 
technologist to the capitalist. Even in the knowledge utilization model, a linear bias tends to 
reduce the overall process to chronological, one-way steps towards completion. It does so by 
making invisible any barriers that might prevent such movement.  
With knowledge as an output, problems associated with the valley of death have been 
viewed in terms of bridging the gaps in the linear progression as knowledge moves from its 
source to a destination. For instance, in 1980, the U.S. Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act, 
which provided the legal framework for universities to patent and license federally-funded 
research. According to the Council on Governmental Relations (1999), this act was in 
response to a debate surrounding the government’s “lack of success in promoting the 
adoption of new technologies by industry” (p. 2). The COGR stated that this was partly 
because of inconsistent policies and practices among governmental funding agencies, 
resulting in a “very limited flow of government funded inventions to the private sector” (p. 
2). In the 1980s, the idea was to infuse the marketplace with academic innovations by 
removing the legal barriers and providing incentives for academics to transfer their work to 
the market. But do such solutions for increasing the flow of invention achieve their goal or 
do they simply reinforce a linear model by assuming that if the conduits are opened, the 
problem will go away? 
The danger of models with information transfer at their core is that they often assume 
an illusory rhetoric of neutrality. As Miller (unpublished) suggested, the term technology 
transfer has become transparent and naturalized as a physical activity that moves a product 
from its origin to destination, making it hard to notice the motives and conflicts of interest 
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that may underlie the transfer (p. 4). And even though information transfer models are still in 
use and even advocated as a basis for ethical standards because they privilege clarity, 
directness, and accessibility (Eubanks, 2001, p. 113), this kind of model neutralizes the 
power of language. Although many have recognized the need for a new model, articulating a 
new one has been difficult. As Doheny-Farina (1992) argued, knowledge does not reside in 
the objects or texts or participants in the transfer. Rather knowledge is “what the participants 
construct and agree upon” (p. 17). As highly rhetorical processes, technology transfer is a 
process of continuous interpretation, negotiation, and re-negotiation of meaning by all the 
participants involved. 
In those negotiations, there is a lot of resistance to the pressures that Mode 2 has put 
on practices. Some have argued that the net result of the Bayh-Dole Act is that the public 
pays twice for research, thereby undermining the public mission of the university. For 
instance, Lieberwitz (2007) reiterated a common viewpoint when she argued that the focus 
on the market as a valid or even superior destination for research results changes the view of 
the university as a public repository of knowledge (p. 61). Lieberwitz cautioned that the 
social cost of removing academic discoveries from the public domain are high and 
questioned whether private entities should own and profit from publicly funded research 
through patents and licenses. “By permitting universities to patent their federally funded 
inventions, the Bayh-Dole Act creates a double cost to the public, as the public initially pays 
for federally funded university research and pays again when the federally funded invention 
is removed from the public domain under a university-owned patent” (Lieberwitz, 2007, p. 
61). In addition to the double cost of research, other social concerns include the public 
perception of research—is the research free of corporate influence? (Lieberwitz, 2007, p. 62). 
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As Rae-Dupree (2008) characterized the situation in the New York Times, one of the 
unintended consequences of the Bayh-Dole Act was to put profit ahead of wonder. 
Against these criticisms of Mode 2 research practices, however, others claim that 
research based on industry partnerships is more transparent because more people have a say 
in the problems that are addressed. Gibbons et al. (1994) maintained that because of the 
varied composition of Mode 2 research teams, “social accountability permeates the whole 
knowledge production process. It is reflected not only in interpretation and diffusion of 
results but also in the definition of the problem and the setting of research priorities” (p. 7). 
In many ways, the linear model is inverted. Instead of moving from theory to practice, 
practice is valued as informing theory. As Fuller (2006) noted, in this new configuration, 
rhetoric is an ethic of productivity versus one of receptivity to new discovery (p. 71). In the 
tension between Mode 1/Mode 2 research practices, criticism has centered on the question of 
whether productivity represents a better measurement than receptivity and whether it really is 
a more socially accountable practice and a wise use of public funds.  
Nevertheless, the pressure to increase Mode 2 research practices remains strong. In 
January 2008, the Chair of the National Science Board responded to the 2008 Science and 
Engineering Indicators report with a policy statement that made specific recommendations to 
redress declining support for U.S. research and development. In addition to recommending 
that the federal government increase its funding levels for basic research, he urged “industry, 
government, the academic sector, and professional organizations [to] take action to 
encourage greater intellectual interchange between industry and academia” (NSF, 2008a, p. 
6). The NSB reasoned that this interchange is necessary for academic researchers to 
understand “the major research challenges that face U.S. industry and industrial 
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competitiveness” (NSF, 2008a, p. 5). They warn that the costs of not working together may 
be severe, particularly for U.S. companies to be able to compete in international markets and 
to employ the highly skilled engineers and scientists needed at home. 
Other reports echoed this sentiment that for increased dialogue and partnerships 
among industry, government, and the academic sector. In a report funded by the U.S. Small 
Business Administration, Palmintera (2007) identified many factors that influence the 
capacity for universities to translate research results into commercially viable products and 
process, including resources such as financing, capital, and the skills needed to act as an 
entrepreneur. “The ‘commercialization side’ of research has been the missing link in the 
pipeline that moves innovation from research to the marketplace. NSF and national policy 
makers should not only be concerned about expanding the research pipeline but also 
accelerating the research through it” (Palmintera, 2007, p. ix). Again, the danger of not doing 
so relates to concepts of American productivity and competitiveness. 
In addition, state governments have asked universities to expand the scope of their 
relationships. For instance, the State of Iowa’s Department of Economic Development 
commissioned the Battelle Memorial Institute to recommend ways to increase economic 
development activity in the state’s biotechnology, advanced manufacturing and information 
technology sectors. In their report Iowa’s Information Technology Strategic Roadmap, one 
key recommendation was to “increase R&D and technology relationships between Iowa IT 
industry and Iowa universities” (Battelle, 2005, p. xvi). Based on input from industry and 
government leaders, Battelle (2005) identified “key observed issues and gaps along the 
continuum from research to commercialization and IT business growth” (p. xvi). In addition 
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to issues relating to infrastructure and capital, IP ownership, and incentives for faculty and 
business, Battelle (2005) identified the need for the following: 
• Need to increase proactive outreach by Iowa’s universities to gain awareness of 
their research capabilities 
• Need dialog between key Iowa technology industry and universities regarding key 
priorities for future research 
• Need to raise the profile of Iowa as an IT state (p. xvii, emphasis in original). 
Although Battelle (2005) recognized that Iowa cannot expect to compete with states such as 
California, Massachusetts, Virginia, and Maryland in IT breadth and depth, it argued that 
Iowa has the ability to develop focused niche areas, targeting specific opportunities. Those 
opportunities, and their first strategy in their roadmap, are primarily based on a greater 
interchange between its universities and industry leaders. 
What is at stake in the dialogue surrounding Mode 1/Mode 2 is not a crisis of normal 
science in which one paradigm replaces another. Rather the crisis is about managing 
boundaries and identities. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn (1996) noted that 
the differences in paradigms are not only about the accumulated facts and theories within a 
field. More specifically, “they are the source of the methods, problem-field, and standards of 
solution accepted by any mature scientific community at any given time.” (p. 103). For Kuhn 
(1996), the replacement of one paradigm for another necessitates a redefinition of problems, 
standards, and methods for accumulating facts and theories. He envisioned a gestalt-switch 
between old and new and between speculation and real scientific solution. For Kuhn (1996), 
the result is incommensurability: “The normal-scientific tradition that emerges from a 
scientific revolution is not only incompatible but often actually incommensurable with that 
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which has gone before” (p. 103). In this sense, the old and new paradigms represent different 
worlds, each having its own vocabulary for theorizing facts and solutions. 
But the problem with Kuhn’s vision is that it fails to recognize the exigencies of 
doing science and technology in an economic, social, and historic context. As Lessl (2005) 
argued, the boundaries of science are not just defined by internal scientific debate, but are 
also shaped by the broader world-view operating in society and culture. Specifically, M2 
brings foreword issues about the freedom those outside the scientific community have in 
interpreting science. The crisis becomes one of managing boundaries and identities when 
authority is dispersed and direct access is allowed.  
Figuration: Managing Boundaries 
To see the points of contention and what is at stake means looking at the arguments 
that constitute Mode 1 and Mode 2 as structured discourses. As I have discussed, one of the 
key structural concepts in Mode 1 is the idea of the disinterested scientist doing “basic” or 
pure research motivated by discovery. The power of Mode 1 has to do with this positioning 
of the scientists as presenting substantive facts arrived at logically and without influence. In 
rhetorical terms, this presentation of fact assumes that language can be used unambiguously. 
Halloran and Bradford (1984) noted two characteristics of scientific and technical writing, 
with the first being the writer’s intention to “convey one and only one meaning” (p. 182). 
Ideally, scientific language is as concrete and exact as mathematics. The second 
characteristic of scientific prose is the absence of the writer, using “plain” language to 
suppress the writer’s individuality and personality. In other words, the style is considered 
arhetorical. As Crick (2004) said, the dividing line between science and rhetoric has been 
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traditionally drawn between logic and persuasion, and between substance and style, or what 
Lanham (2006) called “stuff” and “fluff.” Much activity in science is about proving it is not 
rhetorical, that its facts are logical and objective. In other words, the facts stand on their own.  
Scholars in the social sciences have described the ways that objectivity is constructed 
in scientific discourse. For instance, Latour and Woolgar (1986) discussed the transformation 
of conjecture into scientific fact. They called such transformation a process of “purification,” 
during which the observer and observed disengage from one another. In this disengagement, 
the observed is an “object” that can be examined in isolation by the observer. Latour and 
Woolgar (1986) argued that this objectivity is achieved through transcription devices, such as 
lab notebooks and reports, that record information about the substance. Once recorded, the 
information is then transformed into figures and diagrams that represent the substance. In that 
representation, the substance is bracketed off from the activity that created it, and the 
representation becomes the starting point for articles and discussions (p. 51). “An ‘object’ 
was thus achieved through the superimposition of several statements or documents in such a 
way that all the statements are seen to relate to something outside of, or beyond, the reader’s 
or author’s subjectivity” (p. 84). By erasing all forms of production, facts are stabilized as 
objective reports, creating a rift between ‘object’ and ‘subject.’  
Although Latour and Woolgar (1986) considered the boundaries between subjectivity 
and objectivity, Haraway (1997) analyzed who and what is included within the boundaries. 
Drawing on Robert Boyle’s demonstrations of the vacuum pump in the seventeenth century, 
Haraway (1997) theorized how the roles in science are constituted. The modest witness is a 
key figure in her story:  
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The legitimate and authorized ventriloquist for the object worlds, adding 
nothing from his mere opinions, from his biasing embodiment. And so he is 
endowed with the remarkable power to establish facts. He bears witness: he is 
objective; he guarantees the clarity and purity of objects. His subjectivity is 
his objectivity (p. 24).  
The modest witness embodies the separation of expert knowledge from opinion and the 
technical from the political. As such, this figure occupies a “culture of no culture,”—a 
culture stripped of persuasion and fluff (Haraway, 1997, p.  25). Such a position is what she 
called the “founding gesture” of the modernist narrative and its distinction between experts 
and nonexperts. Haraway (1997) called this distinction figuration: “performative images that 
can be inhabited” (p. 11). In other words, figuration constructs the identities and roles that 
various actors in the process play. The rhetorical style is the substance of the discourse. 
This idea of figuration follows and extends a rich rhetorical tradition about the 
relationship between style and substance. In classical rhetorical theory, Quintilian 
(1856/2006) identified two definitions of figures:   
The first signifies the form of words, of whatever it may be, just as our bodies, 
of whatever they be composed, have a certain shape. The other, which is 
properly termed a figure, is any deviation, either in thought or expression, 
from the ordinary and simple method of speaking, just as our bodies assume 
different postures when we sit, lie, or look back (9.1.10). 
In the first definition, figures are the form itself; in the second, the form is postured— “a 
form of speech artfully varied from common usage” (9.1.14). Quintilian seemed to favor the 
second of the two views. Like tropes, figures take a turn or deviate from direct language. 
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They artfully shape ideas to give what he called “force” and “grace” to our speech. But he 
also stated that figures of speech are not to be taken as mere ornamentation, making what we 
say more attractive. As Quintilian (1856/2006) said, “though figures may seem of little 
importance in establishing a proof by which our arguments are advanced, they make what we 
say probable and penetrate imperceptibly into the mind of the judge” (9.1.19). The “force” 
and “grace” of figures get their power by making an impression on the mind of the audience. 
In his definition of figures, Quintilian highlights an important and continuing 
problem: a divide between the literal and tropic. Central to scientific authority is the idea of a 
literal language. As Halloran and Bradford (1984) pointed out, the ambiguity of figures, 
particularly tropes, runs counter to the scientific enterprise. “Modern science has been slow 
to acknowledge its use of figurative expression, probably due to the long-standing tradition 
which contends that the figures are not suitable for scientific and technical discourse” 
(Halloran & Bradford, 1984, p. 180). They traced the reaction against figurative language to 
the emerging sciences in the seventeenth century, which opted for a plain style over the 
ornate Renaissance style, a “confusing verbal smoke screen, a cloak of mystical gibberish 
with the antithetical goals of expression and obscurity” (p. 181). As they stated, Francis 
Bacon and others sought to uproot the view that science was little more than witchcraft or 
verbal smoke screens of gibberish. The plain style tradition advocated in the seventeenth 
century is still valued. Although figures add to comprehension, they violate “correctness” 
when they embellish the facts. 
A two-domain theory of language, in which some language is literal and other 
figurative, creates the idea that language can be concrete and exact. It also allows the writer 
to remain distant from the content. Hence, passive voice is often favored, letting the objects 
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stand on their own representation. But as Fahnestock (1999) asked, “At what point do the 
figures cease and does ‘ordinary language’ take over?” (p. 37). Although Quintilian settled 
on figuration as artful variance from common usage (9.1.14), he acknowledged the evident 
sophistry of language, “for the same things are constantly expressed in different ways, and 
the thought remains the same while the language is altered” (9.1.16). Though the same idea 
may be expressed differently, its essence remains intact. Such a conception raises the 
question of which expression is literal and which is extraordinary. As Lanham (2006) argued, 
“rhetorical figures are patterns of speech or writing that provide patterns for thought.... The 
figure itself is dead simple: It is a fundamental template, a basic habit of mind in how we pay 
attention to the world” (2006, p. xiii). As a fundamental template, rhetorical figures give 
voice to interests and principles within an historical and cultural context. It places the modest 
witness back in context, as a construct with a history and persuasive power. 
As I argued in Chapter 1, the terms economic development and the public good also 
figure the discourse and stabilize the activity by providing ways to define success in the 
transfer of technologies. But these terms are also conflicted and unstable among those who 
have a stake in how technology transfer is practiced and who gets to participate. In her essay 
“Power, Technology, and the Phenomenology of Conventions,” Star (1991) argued that in 
the processes of standardizing and stabilizing sociotechnical networks, power comes from 
being able to navigate or negotiate insider/outsider status. Part of the process of negotiating 
that status has to do with stabilizing the people, the technology, the partnerships, and the 
meaning of the activity long enough to develop a narrative that makes sense to its 
stakeholders. Star (1991) concluded that power is about “whose metaphor brings worlds 
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together, and holds them there” (p. 52). It is the central metaphor that sets the standards and 
conventions for the collective and has power to authorize discourse.  
Why do these figures have so much persuasive power? From Aristotle, we understand 
rhetoric as the art of persuasion to unite speaker and audience. But how does that connection 
happen? As Bitzer (1959) suggested, “The aim of rhetorical discourse is persuasion; since 
rhetorical arguments, or enthymemes, are formed out of premises supplied by the audience, 
they have the virtue of being self-persuasive” (p. 408). While typically defined as a syllogism 
with a suppressed premise, enthymemes are more than a strategy for constructing an 
argument. Rather, they are the strongest of possible proofs because they are jointly produced 
in a “cooperative interaction between the practitioner and his hearers” (Bitzer, 1959, p. 407). 
As Crick (2004) noted, what makes enthymemes successful is not that the audience provides 
the right piece of an incomplete picture, but that “they can cooperate with the speaker in 
creating an entirely new picture” (p. 24). Power comes through this joint effort to understand 
the situation at hand. 
Many have expanded Bitzer’s view to argue that enthymemes are not just cooperative 
interaction, but a structuring principle of discourse—they rhetorically constitute a framework 
for common interests to take shape. Crick (2004) argued that this kind of space is necessary: 
“it provides a common ground on which imagination and reason can stand together to form 
new ways of understanding the world around us” (p. 38). What we know as science is built 
on cooperative interpretations of the world in which we live. Figures, such as enthymemes, 
provide a rhetorical space for that cooperative interpretation to work itself out. 
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As a rhetorical space for cooperative interpretation, figures can also operate as 
boundary objects for reconciling meaning. In their work, Star and Griesemer (1989) defined 
a boundary object as follows:  
An analytic concept of those scientific objects which both inhabit several 
intersecting social worlds…and satisfy the information requirements of each 
of them. Boundary objects are objects which are both plastic enough to adapt 
to local needs and the constraints of several parties employing them, yet 
robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites (p. 393).  
As Star and Griesemer (1989) argued, boundary objects help develop and maintain coherence 
across heterogeneous groups. They can do so because their structure is recognizable to more 
than one group. For instance, in the sciences, figures such as the public good are ambiguous 
enough and specific enough to manage the translation of various interests into a common 
goal.  
The structure of figures is a key insight to their function as a boundary object. 
Although figures may have different meaning to different people, they represent lines of 
argument and reasoning. As Fahnestock (1999) argued, what figures do particularly well is 
communicate arguments and reasoning iconically. In her analysis of scientific figures, she 
defined figures as epitomes or “techniques of scientific reasoning” that epitomize analogical 
patterns of thinking. Fahnestock (1999) asked: 
What does it mean to say that a verbal figure epitomizes a line of reasoning? 
An epitome, from the Greek verb meaning ‘to cut short or cut upon,’ is in one 
sense a summary, an abstract containing all the essential parts of a larger work 
or text, and, in a slightly different sense, it is a representative or exemplary 
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selection from and then substitution for something longer. The figure, then, is 
a verbal summary that epitomizes a line of reasoning. It is a condensed or 
even diagram-like rendering of the relationship among a set of terms, a 
relationship that constitutes the argument and that could be expressed at 
greater length (p. 24).  
As epitomes, figures both abstract from and act as substitutes for larger works and texts. 
They represent the essential parts of an argument. But, they also represent relationships 
among terms and, as such, are integral to constructing scientific thought. For instance, terms 
such as the public good are figured against what they are not.  
In short, figures oscillate between “stuff” and “fluff,” in which the substance and 
style are inseparable. By examining the figures that constitute technology transfer, we can 
analyze the boundaries that both constrain and enable its practices. In the 1960s, technology 
transfer as a term helped provide a rhetorical space to account for publicly funding university 
research programs. We might ask how the term acted as a boundary object and what other 
devices figured the discourse. As epitomes, the figures in technology transfer not only 
summarize the reasoning behind systems of practice, but they also express relationships 
across boundaries, describing the interests of various groups who have a stake in how those 
practices are defined, including universities, businesses, governmental agencies, and the 
public. As boundary objects, the figures epitomize strategies for consolidating and describing 
scientific authority. 
The question I ask is how have the figures that constitute technology transfer changed 
in the nearly 50 years since the term was coined? Furthermore, whose values, truths, and 
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principles are figured in that discourse, and how do those values gain authority and 
legitimacy? Finally, what has happened to the public good?  
Rhetorical Framework 
In the chapters that follow, I analyze the rhetorical figures that epitomize technology 
transfer as it is situated in an historical and cultural context. To do so, I draw on Kenneth 
Burke’s theory of language as symbolic action. As Burke (1966) argued, language doesn’t 
convey information, but is rather an “aspect of ‘action’, that is, ‘symbolic action’” (p. 44). As 
symbol-using animals, we externalize who we are in language. As action, language is the 
substance of our material practices, the starting point or basis for our interactions in the 
world. From the Greek word hypostasis, meaning that which stands under, substance for 
Burke (1969a) is metaphorically that “which lies at the bottom of a thing, as the groundwork, 
subject matter” (p. 23). As substance, language sets the stage for people to identify and 
connect interests and ideas and is an act for organizing those interests in material practices. In 
other words, human interaction is rhetorical. 
Central to his theory is that key terms in the discourse generate and organize what we 
know as reality. As Burke (1966) said in Language as Symbolic Action, our terminology 
directs, reflects, and selects reality. Terministic screens filter the ways in which we perceive, 
record, and interpret an event. As Burke (1966) pointed out, “we must use terministic 
screens, since we can’t say anything without the use of terms; whatever terms we use, they 
necessarily constitute a corresponding kind of screen; and any such screen necessarily directs 
the attention to one field rather than another” (p. 50). Even scientific discourse, in which 
scientists can take on the role of an objective reporter, is figured within terminologies that not 
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only reflect those observations, but also direct and select the realm of possibilities. As Burke 
(1954) made clear, what we know about the world is implicit in how we talk about it, saying: 
Indeed, as the documents of science pile up, are we not coming to see that 
whole works of scientific research, even entire schools, are hardly more than 
the patient repetition, in all its ramifications, of a fertile metaphor? Thus we 
have, at different eras in history, considered man as the son of God, as an 
animal, as a political or economic brick, as a machine, each such metaphor, 
and a hundred others serving as the cue for an unending line of data and 
generalizations (p. 95).  
Each of these metaphors acts as a lens that frames a field of observation and directs an 
interpretation of reality. As Crusius (1999) explained, in Burke’s view, it is not “data” or 
“reality” that drive research. If that were so, the same story would be told again and again in 
each area of inquiry. “Rather than the data compelling conclusions, the conclusions are 
implicit in our frameworks of interpretation, each with its own ‘fertile metaphor’” (Crusius, 
1999, p. 61). Data and reality are a result of our interpretive frameworks that tell us where to 
look, what to observe, and what counts.  
But such an interpretation of language does not presume that language determines our 
actions or that humans have no agency. As Crusius (1999) said, Burke “is unwilling to part 
with the individual moral agent because that would mean parting with the rhetor. If language 
amounts to strategies for encompassing situations, there must be a strategist” (p. 85). As 
strategist, the rhetor negotiates a point of view, or what Burke (1954) called “orientation,” a 
“bundle of judgments as to how things were, how they are, and how they may be” (p. 14). 
Our orientation is about our sense of relationships and the expectations surrounding conduct 
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and what is proper. As Burke argued, orientation is largely bound up with motives and our 
sense of why people act the way they do. Motives in this sense are a response to a situation, 
an externalization of an action, particularly in instances of conflicting stimuli. “A motive is 
not some fixed thing, like a table, which one can go and look at. It is a term of interpretation, 
and being such, it will naturally take its place within the framework of our Weltanschauung 
as a whole” (Burke, 1954, p. 25). The assigning of motives, then, is a matter of appeal, of 
aligning and articulating one’s interests and expectations in cogent terms and as part of a set 
of relationships. 
As interpretations of reality, motives represent a stance that one takes in response to a 
larger situation. But these interpretations are realized and articulated through language. As 
such, Burke makes no distinction between literal and figurative language—all language is 
figurative. Crusius (1999) described Burke’s definition of reality as “not a neutral ‘thereness’ 
but the projection of a ‘chosen’ (actually mostly learned or inherited) description” (p. 61). In 
other words, language always mediates our reality, and as Crusius said (1999), “is the 
medium in which we live” (p.  62). By collapsing the literal/figurative distinction, Burke’s 
method lets us look at the power and currency of metaphor and other rhetorical figures as 
they are constituted in relationships among people who act with a purpose and within a social 
context.  
Furthermore, by erasing the distinction between the literal and figurative, all language 
is rhetorical. No language is privileged as unmediated or neutral. Burke (1969b) defined 
rhetoric as a function, a realistic act, necessary to social cohesion and cooperation, moving 
the key term in rhetoric from “persuasion” to “identification.” In doing so, we can understand 
rhetoric as negotiated in relationships between rhetors and audience. This does not mean, 
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however, that persuasion is no longer functional. From classical rhetorical theory, we 
understand persuasion as the key term for analyzing discourse. For instance, Aristotle (trans. 
2007) defined rhetoric as “an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of 
persuasion” (p. 37), extensively categorizing and cataloging techniques public speakers used 
to help their auditors come to a decision. It is the art of seeing the means of persuasion in a 
given situation. But as Charland (1987) pointed out, “persuasion” as the key term suggests 
that an audience exists prior to and apart from the discourse to be judged: “it assumes that 
audiences, with their prejudices, interests, and motives, are given and so are extra rhetorical” 
(p. 133). In this assumption, “persuasion” as a term separates the audience from the discourse 
and fails to conceptualize the audience as integral to and participating in the discourse.  
With “identification” as rhetoric’s key term, we can rethink the role of the audience. 
Rather than standing apart, the audience embodies the discourse. In Burke’s terms, the 
audience and speaker are consubstantial. Burke (1969b) explained this idea as follows: A and 
B are not identical. “But insofar as their interests are joined, A is identified with B. Or he may 
identify himself with B even when their interests are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or 
is persuaded to believe so” (p. 20). In this relationship, however, even though A and B are 
substantially one, they are separate, “at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with 
another” (p. 21). This doctrine recognizes the give and take of identifying and aligning 
interests among various people and organizations. That alignment happens through figured 
language: “we might well keep in mind that a speaker persuades an audience by the use of 
stylistic identifications” (Burke, 1969b, p. 46), identifying interests to bring the two 
together—to identify with one another. Rhetoric is a joint act of speaker and audience. 
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By examining the terms in technology transfer, we can get at the substance that 
stands under and “grounds” the discourse in an historical moment. Burke’s definition of 
rhetoric lets us see interpretation, terminology, and persuasion within a larger framework that 
includes not only the speaker, but also the motives that ground the action and the resources 
that bring interests together. As Crusius (1999) argued, for Burke nothing is more 
‘substantial’ than interpretation, the logic of language, and persuasion (p. 121). “For 
substance, in the old philosophies, was an act; and a way of life is an acting-together; and in 
acting together, men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make 
them consubstantial” (Burke, 1969b, p. 21). Language encompasses those actions. With this 
framework, we can ask about the strategies the rhetor uses to bring together common 
interests and that drive an interpretation of reality. In this way, the rhetor’s agency is 
constituted through those strategic moves and interpretations. 
But understanding the rhetor as strategist also means looking at the cultural, social, 
and economic practices that create meaning and value. In practice, technology transfer is 
about the interchange among individuals and collectives, following social practices that have 
regularized rules, resources, and properties—an embodied history of dispositions and 
distinctions which generate and organize practices and representations. As Bourdieu (1998) 
argued, difference is nothing other than “a gap, a distinctive feature, in short a relational 
property existing only in and through its relation with other properties” (p. 6). For Bourdieu, 
social spaces are not external to the individual, but are produced and reproduced in relation to 
a set of distinct and coexisting dispositions. This theory of difference or distinction gives us a 
way to examine the relative value or the symbolic capital of certain gestures, routines, and 
positions as economic and cultural power. 
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A key concept in Bourdieu’s theory of distinction is that of “routine” or the habits of 
daily life that are for the most part transparent. As Faber (2002) said, routines are the 
“touchstones” in our daily activities that help us interpret and structure our interactions 
without spending a lot of time thinking about what we are doing. It is what we accept 
uncritically. Bourdieu (1990) called this act the habitus or “the embodied history, 
internalized as second nature and so forgotten as history” that give practices a relative 
autonomy (p. 56). These routines and habits are the unconscious acts that people use to 
interact within larger societal structures. Habitus acts as a system of cognitive structures that 
is generative, durable, and transposable. In other words, it is both product and producer of 
history and it can be altered in form. Central to this scheme of perception and appreciation is 
language as marks of distinction, identification, and division. In other words, language is the 
symbolic capital through which people perceive and recognize difference and value, a kind of 
capital that can be exchanged for other types of capital, including monetary funds. 
In light of Bourdieu’s ideas about distinction, we might ask about the relative value of 
key terms in technology transfer. To extend Burke’s theory that terms encompass a situation, 
we might consider the value of key terms in a discourse in relation to an organization’s 
ability to generate interest and create the relationships needed to build and sustain the 
organization. Faber (2002) called this ability “image power,” arguing that power in 
organizations comes from the ability to manufacture and control an external image that has 
holding power in the minds of its stakeholders. “Image power is not constant but situational 
and highly dependent on context. It enables people to define others while resisting definitions 
of one’s self. Image power can be fleeting and always operates in strategic accordance within 
and against existing structures” (p. 122). That power comes through knowing how those key 
 43
terms translate into routines. It comes from knowing the terms of the discourse. As a case 
study, the ITI is interesting because its discourse calls into question the traditional, taken-for-
granted discourses that have stabilized science and engineering as institutionalized practices. 
One way to understand how that stability is managed, maintained, and even altered is to 
analyze the rhetorical figures that ground the rules and systems in routines and habits.  
Conclusion 
One of ITI’s key challenges was to communicate its interests. But as Burke said in 
Permanence and Change, “the mere fact that something is to a man’s [sic] interests is no 
guaranty that he will be interested in it” (p. 37). Even if the communication is stated clearly, 
it is hardly communication if the auditor isn’t interested. In the case of ITI, its directors 
struggled with defining those interests internally to each other and externally to potential 
investors. The central question they had to answer was how do we define and communicate 
the value of the institute to a variety of stakeholders, having their own interests and motives 
for working with the institute, or not. And, as Burke (1954) concluded, “we may interest a 
man [sic] by dealing with his interests” (p. 37). In many ways, the ITI had to establish not 
just a physical space for conducting business, but also the rhetorical ground for negotiating 
and structuring those interests.  
As part of structuring those interests, ITI’s directors had to actively foster meaning in 
the imaginations of its investors to make the institute reality. They had to create an 
imaginable narrative framed in recognizable social meanings to get the legitimacy and 
support needed to bring the work forward. Their story is about what Lanham (2006) called 
the “economics of attention” — attention, not a product, as the central resource in an 
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information economy. It is about demonstrating possibilities, getting people to imagine 
success, and creating presence and space for that success to happen. As Bazerman (2002) 
said, “technologies emerge into the social configurations of their times and are represented 
through the contemporary communicative media” (p. 3). By looking at the communication 
media through which ITI externalized its existence, we can begin to better understand the 
valley of death and the social configurations that define technology transfer as a successful 
enterprise. Their story is about communication arrangements shaping and transforming the 
world in which people act. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
To better understand the “valley of death” and why organizations such as the ITI 
struggle to develop and maintain relationships that extend beyond the traditional boundaries 
of the university, I conducted a case study analysis of the ITI as a bounded system with a set 
of problems and relationships that exemplified the many issues and concerns in the field of 
technology transfer. As defined by Stake (1994), a “case” is a set of practices that have 
boundaries and working parts. And although the parts may not always work well, they are 
part of an integrated system that we do not sufficiently understand. Yin (2009) furthered this 
definition by describing the “case” as a place to examine contemporary events within a real-
life context when the investigator has little control over events (p. 2). As such, the purpose of 
this type of study is not to generalize the results beyond the case, but to develop an in-depth 
understanding of the complexities and issues that surround it, looking for common themes 
that may transcend the case and help to develop theories within the field of study (Creswell, 
2007, p. 75 and Yin, 2009, p. 38).  
My study was bounded by time and by a single case. Consistent with case study 
design, I used a variety of techniques to explore the ways in which those involved in the ITI 
made sense of and articulated their vision for the organization. As Herndl and Nahrwold 
(2000) argued, “qualitative research elicits an understanding of communication practices and 
the social practices and subjectivities they produce in ways that other kinds of research 
cannot” (p. 259). To examine these structures and subjectivities in technology transfer, I 
collected data through participant observations, interviews with the people who were 
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associated with the organization, and documents that were helping to will this organization 
into existence. My study ran from October 3, 2007 through July 31, 20082.  
In the sections that follow, I describe my methodology for this research study. I begin 
by describing the organization and the participants in my study. I then discuss the benefits 
and limitations of my status as an “insider” to the organization as well as the document set 
collected. I conclude this chapter by outlining the methods used to collect and analyze the 
data, including a discussion of Burke’s cluster analysis.  
Site Description 
In the fall of 2006, the ITI received a $1 million state grant in start-up funds to 
organize and develop university/industry partnerships as a way to stimulate economic 
development. In the funding proposal, the ITI research directors projected that the $1 million 
investment would leverage $7.9 million in external support and provide a return to the state 
through the creation of six new companies, three new major industrial collaborations, and a 
40 percent increase in research funding. In short, the organization had two goals: to make 
ISU more competitive for large research grants from public and private sources and to 
increase IT-based economic growth. They would meet those goals by collaborating. The 
model brought together five IT-related university research centers, including the following 
areas of specialization: 
• Emerging interface technologies 
                                                
2 On October 3, 2007, my university’s Institutional Review Board ruled my study 
exempt. In addition, the ITI provided a letter in support of the study. 
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• Information infrastructure 
• Information security 
• Algorithmic models of intelligence 
• Informatics and combinatorial experimentation for materials discovery and design 
In addition to these university research centers, the ITI had an advisory board that included 
industry leaders from a handful of Fortune 500 companies as well as several entrepreneurial 
start-up companies. It was hoped that the corporations would eventually commit to research 
memberships.  
Although university/industry partnerships are not new, ITI’s model is different for 
two reasons. First, the Director of ITI envisioned that all of these players would be co-located 
in the same place. He described his vision as follows: “Industry will bring in people to be in a 
think tank to address unique problems of the company. Companies bring their problems to 
the Institute to be worked on and solved in a collaborative environment” (start-up proposal, 
July 21, 2006). In effect, this co-location would encourage the kind of water-cooler talk and 
think-tank atmosphere needed to foster broad collaboration. Second, ITI’s model also 
brought together directors of five different university research centers with the idea that they 
would work together on problems that spanned their areas of expertise. In a press release in 
2007, the director of ITI summarized the idea behind this organization by saying, “All of us 
agree that we’re stronger working together than apart” (Geoffroy, 2007). 
In many ways, the ITI was modeled after the largest of these five university research 
centers—the Emerging Technologies Applications Center (ETAC). ETAC is an 
interdisciplinary research center with $20 million in ongoing contract research with industry 
and government. It supports more than 50 faculty and 200 students from departments across 
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the university, offering PhD and Masters degrees in Human Computer Interaction. 
Considered an entrepreneurial atmosphere, ETAC supports interdisciplinary teams working 
on a range of contract research projects for corporations and the Department of Defense as 
well as receiving grants from funding agencies such as the National Science Foundation and 
the National Institutes of Health. ETAC’s director is also the Director of the ITI. When 
envisioning ITI, he said: “We want to infuse the cross-cultural and entrepreneurial nature of 
ETAC to other groups” (field notes, October 4, 2007). 
But the ITI had a relatively short history. Table 1 outlines the major milestones 
relating to the organization’s beginning phase. 
Table 1: Major milestones in the ITIs organizational beginning phase. 
Date Milestone 
Fall 2006 Secured $1M from State of Iowa 
May 2007 Received approval from ISU Board of Regents  
• Website is live 
• Postcard is distributed 
June 2007 Leased facility in research park 
October 2007 Gave presentation to ISU president & provost 
November 2007 Held Industrial Advisory Board meeting 
• Website updates left unpublished 
December 2007 Locked into a holding pattern 
• All marketing materials put on hold 
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After receiving $1 million in start up costs from the State of Iowa, it was formally 
approved by the State of Iowa Board of Regents and announced to the public in May 2007. 
To prepare for the opening, the marketing team created a website and postcard. By June, the 
ITI had a physical location in ISU’s research park, and it began renting out space to local 
start-up companies. In November, it held its first advisory board meeting, bringing together 
industry leaders from the Fortune 500 companies with university faculty from across the 
campus, and start-up companies located at the site. The meeting was meant to be a starting 
point for defining the ITI’s purpose and scope. For that meeting, the marketing team prepared 
a page for the website about those industry leaders. It was never posted to the site. By 
December, all marketing materials were put on hold and activity relating to the ITI seemed to 
come to a standstill. No one, I was told, could agree on the organization’s vision and mission. 
Without that agreement, the directors struggled to move forward.  
When I began my research in January 2008, there seemed to be very little to study in 
terms of “technology transfer.” No technologies were being developed. No partnerships with 
industry had been established, and very little was happening toward fulfilling the promises 
the organization had made in its funding proposal. But, the problems the ITI faced were 
certainly not unique to the organization. Their struggle to define the institutional structure 
raised important questions about the durability of “economic development” as a structuring 
term. As the pressure continues to mount for such partnerships between academia and 
industry, the ITI as a case offers the opportunity to see how the value of that term is 
constructed by the participants who have a stake in moving the organization forward. This 
case also gives us an opportunity to take a critical look at the structural relations of the 
transfer of academic science and technology as a “public good.” What makes this term 
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durable and portable across disciplinary and institutional boundaries? In other words, what 
kind of work do these terminologies do in the context of technology transfer, particularly in 
relation to the valley of death?  
Insider Status 
Prior to and during my study, I worked with all of my participants on a variety of 
public relations projects, including print and electronic materials for the ITI. When 
considering a site for my dissertation, I initially resisted the idea of studying an organization 
of which I was a part. That resistance had to do with the kind of trust and commitment that 
qualitative researchers ask of their participants. I questioned whether I wanted to enter that 
relationship with my co-workers. Furthermore, I was an insider, having been a part of the 
organization prior to, during, and after my study. 
But my status as an insider had several advantages. First, because of my relationship 
with my participants, I had access to documents and information that an outsider simply 
would not have had. One participant even said that he could give me such access because he 
knew me, and he trusted me. Second, having worked for the organization, I knew the 
questions to ask in the interviews. I had an understanding of the issues the participants faced 
as they worked on the ITI project. I knew their histories and concerns. Finally, having 
worked with these people, my presence and role in the organization were defined. Being 
there as a participant observer gave me a different vantage point. I could tell the difference 
between what Geertz (1973) called the blinks and winks of a particular culture. As he 
explained, two boys are rapidly contracting the eyelid of the right eye: is it an involuntary 
twitch or a conspiratorial wink? (p. 6). The act of ethnography is not the techniques and 
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procedures, but the sorting through of “piled-up structures of inference and implication” (p. 
7). For Geertz (1973), ethnography is the “thick description” that comes from being there. 
Finding our feet, he said, is the difficult part, because this kind of research is more than just 
talk. Rather, it is about conversing and sorting through the “structures of significations” (p. 
9). In this case study, my own interpretations of the case had a lot do with sorting through 
layers of meanings. As an insider, I was privy to many of the significations used to construct 
meaning within that culture—my feet were well grounded in the cultural discourse 
surrounding the ITI’s development. At the same time, however, this case was limited by the 
fact that it was not a multi-dimensional voicing of the phenomena. My access to participants 
was limited to people I had worked with at ITI and ETAC. Because of those relationships, I 
had to be more cautious in selecting participants than if I had been an outsider. 
Finally, some researchers might call sites such as mine a “sample of convenience.” 
My reasons for studying the ITI, however, had little to do with convenience. Rather, my 
study followed an interest in teaching and studying technical communication and the ways 
people make complex knowledge available to different audiences with different needs, 
particularly in workplace settings. Because the ITI was new, it represented an opportunity to 
not only see how the directors positioned the organization in a situated context, but also to be 
able to examine the ways in which they managed and articulated several difficult issues in 
technology transfer: the public-private partnerships needed to develop technologies; 
technology seen as a tool for economic development; and the value of public-private 
partnerships as it is captured and communicated to various stakeholders. As a case, the ITI 
typified technology transfer as a negotiated activity in a complex network of people and 
organizations having varying needs and interests. 
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Methods 
When my study began in October 2007, the ITI existed primarily on paper. Although 
the organization had leased office space, only a few start-up companies were located there. 
Therefore the idea of observation was problematic—there was no organization, per say, to 
observe. My access to the ITI came through to my job managing and writing publications for 
the Emerging Technologies Applications Center, the largest of the five research centers that 
came together to establish the ITI. The director of ETAC was also the director of ITI. Given 
the close relationship between ETAC and ITI, several ETAC staff members also did work for 
the ITI. I was one of those staff members.  
I began working for ETAC in January of 2006. As a member of ETAC’s marketing 
team, I wrote and coordinated production of its newsletter, websites, and other marketing 
materials related to special events. In my role, I was involved in defining and crafting the 
message as well as writing text and coordinating production. As the largest of the five centers 
belonging to ITI, ETAC also assumed responsibility for ITI’s communication needs, 
developing marketing materials, writing reports, and interacting with the news media. 
Beginning in late 2006, I led the creative team in designing a logo, a website, and a postcard 
announcing the Institute’s creation. These materials had to be in place before the ITI’s public 
announcement in May 2007. For the website, I was the primary architect and writer, using 
language from internal documents written by the director and imposing a standard 
architecture: Home, About ITI, and News & Events. The website became a major point of 
rhetorically defining the organization. Most of my field notes came from my interactions 
with other ITI staff as we were working on the website and other marketing materials for the 
public. 
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During my study, I took notes during ETAC staff meetings on items relating to ITI as 
well as to informal conversations and meetings that I had with my participants about the ITI. 
My status as a participant observer was tied to my part-time research assistantship with 
ETAC. My field notes are transcriptions and reflections on discussions or comments made 
about the ITI during my regular working hours at ETAC.  
Interviews 
During the study, I interviewed five people directly involved with ITI to discuss 
themes related to my research questions. I had intended to interview all of the research 
directors involved with the ITI. But, during the course of my study, the tensions between 
ETAC staff and the research directors were high, and I understood from ETAC staff that 
interviewing these research directors might have exacerbated the problems. I had to respect 
that sentiment.  
These single interviews were audio-recorded (with participant’s permission), 
transcribed, and erased within 48 hours of the interview. Participants included: 
• John—Director of ETAC and the Information Technology Institute 
• Kay —Administrative Specialist (ETAC and ITI) 
• Daniel — Director of Research Center II and member of ITI  
• Guy — Graphic designer for ETAC and ITI 
• Mark — Science writer for the university’s news service 
I invited these people to participate because they were involved in conceptualizing, writing, 
or designing materials for the ITI. Participation in this study was voluntary with each 
participant signing an informed consent document outlining the parameters of the study and 
their role. Participants were told that prior to publication they would be asked to make 
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comments on drafts. Their names are fictitious. In general, all of my participants were open 
to being interviewed and were thoughtful, reflective, and forthcoming in their view of the 
ITI. In the following, I describe these participants in more detail. 
• John is the Director of ITI and wrote the initial white paper and proposal to the 
Battelle Infrastructure Platform Grants program. John is also the director of the 
Emerging Technologies Applications Center (ETAC) at Iowa State University, an 
interdisciplinary research center that manages more than $20 million in ongoing 
contract research for industry and government agencies. The research supports 
more than 50 faculty members and 200 students. At ETAC, he directs its graduate 
program in Human Computer Interaction. John is a full professor in mechanical 
engineering, but also has industry experience, serving as a vice president of 
product development for a Minneapolis startup company and heading product 
development for another startup company in Ames. He is a Fellow of the ASME, 
holds three U.S. patents, and is the recipient of numerous professional honors and 
awards. In conversations with me about his work, he has said he always tries to 
find ways to combine his industry/university experience. 
• Kay is the administrative specialist for ETAC and ITI. She has worked for the 
university for more than 30 years in various departments and has a degree in 
business. In many ways, Kay was the first stop and gatekeeper to John. Having 
worked for ETAC for seven years, Kay facilitated growth in its research program, 
helped create and expand the HCI graduate program, and managed ETAC’s 
external image via a newsletter, the website, and other public relations projects, 
including demos and tours. She was also involved in administering ITI and 
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participated in their meetings and facilitated communication and email traffic 
among the members. During my time at ETAC, I worked closely with Kay on a 
number of marketing projects. She was my direct supervisor and took marketing 
very seriously. When it came to the ITI projects, she was excited to take what we 
had done for ETAC to the ITI. 
• Daniel is the director of one of the research centers that joined with ETAC to 
work on ITI. Daniel is a University Professor in Electrical and Computer 
Engineering. In addition to teaching and research, Daniel runs an NSF-sponsored 
statewide project to work with high schools to get students involved and 
interested in IT. He is also founder and CTO of a private company. In the past, I 
worked with Daniel on writing projects related to his work with the high schools. 
• Guy is a full-time graphic designer for Holmes Lab, a government-owned, 
contractor-operated research facility of the U.S. Department of Energy that is run 
by Iowa State University. Holmes Lab Graphics outsources its creative talent to 
other departments and research centers on campus, including ETAC. Guy and I 
worked together on a number of marketing pieces for ETAC, including a twelve-
page newsletter that came out twice a year. When the ITI was funded, Guy was 
part of the team that worked on developing a name, logo, and website for the 
organization. I interviewed Guy because I was interested in his ideas about how 
new organizations build their identity, particularly organizations related to 
technology transfer.  
• Mark is a science writer for ISU’s News Service, working with various units on 
campus to disseminate information about research at ISU. In addition, Mark is 
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also on the university’s research and economic development council. I worked 
with Mark on a number of press releases for ETAC and ITI. I wanted to interview 
him because he was not directly involved in the ITI’s day-to-day activities. As 
such, he had a more “outside” view of ITI and its position in the university that 
neither the other participants nor I had.  
The interviews were semi-structured (see Appendix A for interview questions). For the 
interviews, I prepared a set of questions relating to defining technology transfer. In short, I 
was interested in the rhetorical devices used to represent technology transfer to various 
stakeholders; the role of ethos and representation in defining the value and success of 
technology transfer; and the ways that the organization’s identity was tied to other definitions 
of success and value in technology transfer. These questions framed the interview and helped 
to guide the conversation.  
Documents 
In addition to interviewing people, I analyzed many documents related to ITI’s 
creation, including: 
• A white paper written by ITI Director John called ITI: Advancing Iowa’s IT 
Economy to outline initial concept for the organization. Dated June 2006. 
• The start-up proposal to the Battelle Infrastructure Platform Grants program. ITI 
Director John wrote this proposal with four other research center directors signing 
on as co-principle investigators. Dated July 21, 2006.  
• Press release written by ISU News Service announcing the recipients of the 
Battelle Infrastructure Platform Grants program. Dated October 3, 2006. 
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• Press release written by ISU News Service announcing the establishment of ITI. 
Dated November 5, 2007. 
• News article in Des Moines Business Record about the ITI and its mission. Dated 
January 19, 2009. 
• Website written and designed for public announcement of the ITI in May 2007. 
Following its initial posting in May, the site was revised to include more content. 
One of the first revisions included a new page in preparation for the November 
Industrial Advisory Board meeting of the corporate leaders who were on the 
Advisory board. The page was never published. Several of the research directors 
seemed to take issue with the role of the industry leaders. 
• Electronic slide presentation written and presented by John to the University 
President and Provost. Dated October 12, 2007. 
Although I had access to many documents relating to the ITI, I selected the above list for two 
reasons. Except for the website, I had nothing to do with writing the documents. The white 
paper and start-up proposal were written by the director of the ITI with the other research 
center directors acting as co-principle investigators. The press releases and news articles 
were written by two science writers: one affiliated with the university and one from a local 
business publication. I also chose these documents because they all had to do with defining a 
new organization, introducing its purpose and trajectory for different audiences. In a sense, 
they are the touchstone narratives that map out the organization’s qualities and activities, 
defining the ITI’s situation and reasons for its existence. In addition, I compared the ITI’s 
website content to that of the other research centers that had joined the ITI. Those sites were 
accessed and recorded in March 2009. 
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Cluster Analysis 
To interpret the symbolic actions in my case study, I followed Burke’s method known 
as cluster analysis to uncover the cultural principles that were shaping and shaped by the 
discourse. In “The Philosophy of Literary Form,” Burke (1941) explained cluster analysis: 
Now, the work of every writer contains a set of implied equations. He [sic] 
uses “associational clusters.” And you may, by examining his work, find 
‘what goes with what” in these clusters—what kinds of acts and images and 
personalities and situations go with his notions of heroism, villainy, 
consolation, despair, etc. And although he [may] be perfectly conscious of the 
act of writing…, he cannot possibly be conscious of the interrelationships 
among all these equations. Afterward, by inspecting his work “statistically,” 
we or he may disclose by objective citation the structure of motivation 
operating here. There is no need to “supply” motives. The interrelationships 
themselves are his motives…. The motivation out of which he writes is 
synonymous with the structural way in which he puts events and values 
together when he writes; and however consciously he may go about such 
work, there is a kind of generalization about these interrelations that he could 
not have been conscious of, since the generalization could be made by the 
kind of inspection that is possible only after the completion of the work (p. 
20). 
In this passage, Burke emphasized that motives do not exist prior to a situation, but rather are 
an interpretation of the situation. By examining key words for “what goes with what,” we can 
begin to critique the interrelationships that constitute the situation and the motives at play. 
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In this type of analysis, it is important to note Burke’s use of the term “motive.” For 
Burke, “motives” are not merely a response to a situation, but are synonymous with the 
situation itself. In Permanence and Change, Burke (1954) suggested, 
Man’s [sic] words for motives are merely a shorthand description of 
situations. One tends to think of a duality here, to assume some kind of breach 
between situation and a response. Yet the two are identical…. The situation 
was our motive, and our word for the motive characterizes the situation (p. 
220–221). 
In this passage, Burke (1954) calls to mind Bitzer’s (1968) ideas about situation, but removes 
the illusory duality between the situation and response. Although Bitzer (1968) argued that 
the situation always precedes the response, he maintained that the response follows, and 
therefore stands apart from, the situation. In Burke’s conception, motives as situations are 
about articulating a worldview and identifying one’s own position in that situation. As 
Jasinski (2001) argued, rather than duality, Burke set up a dialectical relationship between 
orientation and situation. Motives, then, are constituted in the interaction between the two. 
“Motives exist in the vocabularies that we use for grasping situations and formulating 
responses to situations. Motives, in short, appear to be cultural principles embodied in 
vocabularies that shape and guide human perception and action” (Jasinski, 2001, p. 370). In 
this way, motives are not conceived as standing “behind” an action. Nor are they singular in 
purpose. Rather, motives saturate actions and are embodied in vocabularies that constitute 
“terministic screens”—selections, deflections, and reflections of “reality.” To understand 
“motive” means examining the cultural principles embedded in human action. Cluster 
 60
analysis of key terms opens up a way to examine the how people identify and articulate their 
position in a discourse. 
In my study, I followed these procedures for cluster criticism: 
1. Formulated research questions about the rhetoric of technology transfer and 
selected a rhetorical artifact for analysis 
2. Identified key terms 
3. Charted the terms that clustered around the key terms 
4. Analyzed the clusters, looking for patterns and themes that helped to explain the 
case. 
In suggesting methods for conducting cluster analysis, Foss (2004) outlined two ways to 
identify key terms: frequency and intensity. In my case, frequency had little to no bearing on 
my choice of terms. Although frequency is often a useful starting point in a grounded 
approach to understand the shape of the discourse, in my case, the selection of terms 
followed a theoretical approach to coding, drawing and building on theory when examining 
data. Therefore, I looked at the intensity of terms, words that were central to my research 
questions and informed by my theoretical frame. For instance, economic development has 
been widely used in the literature about technology transfer to justify the call for increased 
partnerships between university and industry leaders. I was interested in the ways that term 
was figured as a cultural principle, particularly in relation to ideas about the public good—a 
concept that has historically situated research practices. In paying attention to these terms, I 
wanted to examine the way these terms are negotiated in the discourse and the ideas that 
“clustered” with those terms. 
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To do so, I read and reread the data, transcribing my own field notes and interviews, 
reviewing the transcriptions and other documents for emerging patterns and themes 
surrounding the use these key terms. To organize and code the data, I used the software 
package Atlas.ti6 to help manage coding and analysis. I proceeded as follows: 
1. Searched textual data to find key terms and to mark the paragraphs in which the 
key terms appeared 
2. Analyzed the clusters surrounding key terms, using the memo tool to annotate 
specific passages 
3. Examined the clusters in context and in relation to other textual data 
4. Made inferences about the data based on these results. 
In this process, Atlas.ti6 helped me explore and annotate the data as I searched for and coded 
the figures that clustered around economic development in the texts. I then analyzed the 
clusters, highlighting relationships to other terms, and making notes with Atlas.ti’s “memo” 
tool. In the end, however, I returned to my hard copies of the transcripts and documents, 
reading, rereading, and making notes about the patterns and themes relating to the rhetorical 
figures that clustered around my key terms, the organization’s ethos, and its audience. As 
Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested, text segments can be read and analyzed on different 
levels. Descriptive codes identify predefined areas of interest, such as key terms or figures in 
the discourse. Interpretive codes add a layer of meaning—in this instance, charting the terms 
that surround the key terms. And, pattern codes consider how themes and concepts identified 
at the descriptive and interpretive level relate across the dataset. In my work, I looked at the 
rhetorical grounding of these terms as a way to theorize about the ways language constitutes 
technology transfer as a dialectical set of positions that is always being constituted. 
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In chapters four and five, I present my analysis of the rhetorical figures that organize 
the discourse in technology transfer. These rhetorical figures simplify a complex situation by 
providing a visualization technology to situate technological practices and configure 
relationships. We can study these practices and relationships through the rhetorical devices 
that give those models of success structure and meaning as it is negotiated and renegotiated 
across academic, industry, and public boundaries.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In the preceding chapters, I outlined a theoretical and methodological framework for 
analyzing the ways in which technology transfer is rhetorically figured, particularly in 
relation to defining success and the rhetorical ground for authorizing such criteria. As I 
argued, current discussions about technology transfer today are often about differences in 
how academic research is valued in different discursive realms. As Carolyn R. Miller 
(unpublished) pointed out, the question at the center of technology transfer is an old 
rhetorical one—“cui bono?” or “for whose benefit” (p. 12). One of the key findings in my 
study was a tension between a traditional Mode 1 science for science’s sake model and a 
more entrepreneurial Mode 2 set of practices that values partnerships, crossing disciplinary 
and university boundaries for the sake of economic development.  
In conducting my case study, I wanted to understand the power of “economic 
development” as a figure for activating a model of research—in other words, to bridge the 
valley of death. In many ways, the linear model that has typified technology transfer as the 
flow of objects from one point to the next has become a naturalized discourse. But embedded 
in that seemingly smooth transfer of knowledge are motives, interests, and investments that 
seek further advantage in the political and economic landscape. As Miller (unpublished) 
suggested, “it is the appearance of death that gives the metaphor its power, by cloaking its 
appeals in the guise of (objective) reference” (p. 13). Mode 2 research practices and the 
attendant “economic development” narrative call the guise of Mode 1’s objectivity into 
question. Although some have argued that Mode 2 does not replace Mode 1 knowledge 
production (for instance Gibbons et al., 1994, Mirowski & Sent, 2002), others have described 
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this change as the “new economy” for universities, moving from a public good/learning 
regime to an academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004, p. 
7). In my data, the tension between these two regimes is paramount. As a new organization, 
the ITI had invested heavily in the “economic development” narrative to describe the benefits 
of its alignment with Mode 2 practices. 
As in many rhetorical analyses, this story is about language, authority, and power, 
particularly in relation to the dialectical relationship between identification and division. In 
his A Rhetoric of Motives, Burke (1969b) said, “identification is compensatory to division” 
(p. 22), describing identification as a place in which individual interests are joined or 
identified by a common shared principle. At the same time, the individual remains unique, a 
“locus of motives” (p. 20) that is at once a distinct and mutually adjusted set of terms. Burke 
(1969b) described this tension between division and identification in terms of a neurotic who 
is ultimately at peace: 
Rhetorically, the neurotic’s every attempt to legislate for his [sic] own conduct 
is disorganized by rival factions within his own dissociated self. Yet, 
considered Symbolically, the same victim is technically “at peace,” in the 
sense that his identity is like a unified, mutually adjusted set of terms. For 
even antagonistic terms, confronting each other as parry and thrust, can be 
said to “cooperate” in building of an over-all form (p. 23). 
In technology transfer, the parry and thrust between the two modes of research practice also 
work to build an overall symbolic form within which people act. The results of this case 
study illuminate the locus of motives at issue in structuring publicly-supported academic 
research programs. 
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This chapter explores how Burke’s doctrine of consubstantiality can be used to see 
technology transfer as a symbolic and rhetorical discourse, which is at once organized and 
disorganized by rival factions cooperating and confronting each other to build an overall 
form. In my analysis, the tensions between Mode 1 and Mode 2 and between the public good 
and economic development were for the most part articulated as differences between basic 
and applied research—categories instantiated in the linear model. Although scientists in 
general and my participants in particular most likely have a much more sophisticated 
understanding of technology transfer, the linear model is often used as a resource for 
persuading and appealing to different audiences. As Goodnight (1982) discussed, the 
separation of such spheres are used to categorize argumentation. For Goodnight (1982), the 
spheres are “the branches of activity—the grounds upon which arguments are built and the 
authorities to which different arguers appeal” (p. 216). As separate categories, the spheres 
stand apart from one another with different purposes, strategies, and resources. My 
participants articulated places of identification and division by drawing on the categories 
implied in the linear model. 
In this chapter, I share my findings, returning to the research questions that framed 
this research study.  
• First, I analyzed the rhetorical devices used to define technology transfer. I 
identified two kinds of metaphors in the data: platforms and bridges. These 
metaphors functioned to create a rhetorical space for the ITI as well as Mode 2 
practices, acting as a visualization technology that allowed people to see how they 
may or may not fit into the organization. These figures constituted a space for 
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various audiences to think through the ITI as a virtual prototype of a new 
organization. They also worked to circumsrcibe a space for Mode 2 practices. 
• Second, I examined these rhetorical devices in relation to ethos, an appeal to an 
interpreted set of motives or cultural principles. In this case, I look at the ways in 
which ethos was used to structure a rhetorical ground for authorizing Mode 2 and 
the ways in which those grounds were contested and structured against Mode 1. 
The ITI’s website, its primary mode of ethos, is central to this discussion.  
• Third, I considered audience and the ways various audiences acted as co-
constituents of the discourse surrounding the ITI. Although the rhetorical devices 
used to describe the ITI enabled several external audiences to engage with the 
organization, these devices constrained relations among an internal audience—the 
ITI’s research center directors. Without a strongly contextualized goal, these 
audiences failed to find a common ground in which competing interests could 
cooperate. 
As is often the case, my treatment of these three topics—logos, ethos, and audience—are 
intertwined because each term modifies the other. Nonetheless, these categories frame the 
ITI’s story and the ways in which economic development configured a rhetorical authorizing 
grounds for identifying and negotiating interests. I conclude this chapter by suggesting that 
although certain boundary objects kept the group together despite their disparate goals, in the 
end, those objects were not enough to bridge the valley of death. 
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Rhetorical Figures: Platforms & Bridges 
In Chapter 2, I discussed Mode 1 and Mode 2 knowledge production as narratives 
that describe and characterize the authority and structure of academic research programs. 
Key terms in those narratives externalize the interests and motives that organize the 
discourse. In my study, I found that economic development as a key term represented a 
significant point of conflict within the ITI—it represented a different version of reality. As 
Burke (1954) stated:  
We discern situational patterns by means of the particular vocabulary of the 
cultural groups into which we are born. Our minds, as linguistic products, are 
composed of concepts (verbally molded) which select certain relationships as 
meaningful. These relationships are not realities, they are interpretations of 
reality—hence different frameworks of interpretation will lead to different 
conclusions as to what reality is” (p. 35). 
In other words, key terms function as indices for relationships. Saturated with motives, these 
terms reflect an interpretation of cultural formations, structuring and revealing contested 
grounds. In the case of the ITI, the rhetorical grounds of technology transfer as economic 
development were highly contested.  
The vignette below was taken from my field notes in early January 2008. It describes 
a point when the ITI was rhetorically creating a space to justify and explain a set of 
relationships as a new model for technology transfer. One of those spaces was the website: a 
virtual space that articulated a set of motives and relationships. This vignette followed a 
lengthy period of outlining a vision and identity for the ITI and summarizes the disagreement 
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among the research directors over conceptualizing the ITI as a unique “platform” and new 
mechanism to “bridge” academic-led research and innovation in the marketplace. 
Vignette I: Whats the difference? 
At our meeting this morning, Kay told me that all marketing for ITI is on hold 
for now. The problem is that the center directors disagree, particularly about 
the vision and goals of the institute and what the institute should do…. As 
Kay said, these differences have to do with traditional research and traditional 
definitions of an institute and John and Daniel want to push the boundaries of 
those definitions. Kay said the questions at this time are:  
• Who gets to be leader? 
• How does the money get spent?  
• What are the goals/vision? 
The upshot for marketing is that we cannot put out a newsletter or “fluff” 
piece without knowing the vision or direction for ITI. Kay said maybe in the 
fall, but the problem is that ITI loses out on the momentum of a marketing 
piece at this early stage. In the fall, ITI will be halfway into its 3-year 
commitment. She asked, in fall, is it too late to be effective? 
Field notes, January 4, 2008 
 
When I wrote this entry in my research journal, I had no idea that things were going 
to come to such a standstill. Up until that point, the marketing team had worked on 
developing a name, logo, website, and a postcard announcing the ITI, and we had plans to 
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create a brochure and newsletter. The purpose of these materials was to help establish the 
institute’s identity and to get industry leaders to participate in what was being positioned as a 
new concept for technology transfer—university and industry leaders would not only 
collaborate but also co-locate to work on complex problems that crossed disciplinary and 
university lines. But as shown in the vignette, the five research center directors who had 
come together to form the institute had a fundamental disagreement over this definition of 
technology transfer. That disagreement, as Kay pointed out, had to do with the tension 
between traditional definitions of university research and this more entrepreneurial mode of 
structuring a research program.  
When the above vignette was written, the ITI faced its own valley of death. The 
research directors disagreed on how to build the “bridge” needed to move from the idea of 
the institute to sustainability. Questions about leadership and money all related to the 
organization’s goals and vision. If they couldn’t agree on the vision, then how could they 
agree on how to spend the money or who gets to lead? Exacerbating the problem were its 
public representations of the organization, i.e. its website and other marketing materials that 
characterized the ITI for external audiences. In large part, the purpose of the marketing 
materials was to create an organizational identity to help the ITI move from a virtual 
prototype to a functioning organization. To begin to understand how that identity was 
constituted, I looked at two documents written by the John to examine how the institute was 
positioned in relation to its audience. These documents, a white paper and start-up proposal, 
were written in 2006 to secure funds for the organization. But they were also the basis for all 
the marketing materials, providing the language and vision for the text and images. In these 
documents, technology transfer and the ITI were defined in relation to the need to build a 
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new “platform” for university and industry partnerships as a way to “bridge” the gap and 
empower IT economic development—all structural terms that give the discourse a substance 
or ground for individual actions. 
The Terms of Structuring an Institute: A Unifying Home & Unique Platform 
From the very beginning, the ITI was positioned in terms of Mode 2 research and the 
economic development narrative that seems to follow as its justification. Indeed, the impetus 
for the ITI came from a set of recommendations made by the Battelle Memorial Institute to 
the State of Iowa’s Department of Economic Development following a research study about 
the state’s IT sector. The Battelle study included: 
• Economic analysis of the state’s IT sector  
• Assessment of the infrastructure needed to support the IT sector compared to 
other states  
• SWOT analysis: strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats 
• Proposed strategies for making the state’s IT sector more competitive 
• Implementation plan, including initial steps (Battelle, 2005, p. ix). 
In its final report, Iowa’s Information Technology Strategic Roadmap, Battelle (2005) 
concluded that Iowa did not yet have the critical mass of IT activity that would place it 
among leading states in either IT R&D or IT commercialization. At the same time, the report 
identified IT-based economic development as a potential area for the state to build a “notable 
presence” (p. ix). To do so, Battelle (2005) outlined five strategies meant to further the state’s 
research base and to build its IT industry. The first strategy included several action items to 
“strengthen and accelerate” the connections between Iowa universities and Iowa’s IT 
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industry, calling for a Strategic Technology Platform Grant program to fund projects that 
enhanced those relationships (p. xvii).  
In response to the Battelle recommendations, ETAC and ITI Director John wrote the 
start-up proposal with the four other center directors signing on as co-principle investigators 
for funding the ITI. In their proposal, they envisioned the new institute as a “unifying home,” 
bringing together ISU’s IT-related research centers and serving as a “unique platform” for 
science and technology commercialization, extending beyond the confines of the university 
to include industry partners and entrepreneurial start-up companies (start-up proposal, July 
21, 2006). These structural metaphors—home and platform—suggest that the infrastructure 
for moving the institute from an abstract idea to a sustainable organization had yet to be laid. 
Rhetorically, John’s start-up proposal worked to outline a vision for the ITI in relation to the 
needs identified in the Battelle report.  
But the start-up proposal also circumscribed a space and value for Mode 2 practices. 
In this document, the ITI was positioned as a response to the valley of death and the need to 
take “better economic advantage of the research strength in our universities” (start-up 
proposal, July 21, 2007). Although these structural terms worked to establish the 
“groundwork” or foundation for building an institute, they were also making room for Mode 
2 knowledge production as a substantive and authoritative discourse. As Burke (1962) 
explained, substance is both literally and metaphorically that which stands beneath—the 
bottom, prop, or groundwork of the subject matter or argument of a narrative (p. 23). In this 
way, substance is a starting point or beginning on which to build. In the case of the ITI, the 
function of terms like a “unifying home” and “unique platform” was to set the stage, creating 
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substance by positioning the organization within a set of arguments that structured the 
organization one way and not the other.  
But while metaphors “new home” and “unique platform” implied that a new model 
was being proposed, they were also at the same time positioning the ITI as a new conduit for 
speeding up the technology transfer as it has been traditionally conceptualized. In John’s 
start-up proposal, the underlying substance for his line of argument was about “bridging” 
gaps between basic research and applied technologies and between discovery and solutions. 
In the proposal, the PIs sketched out a model to “expand our capacity for foundational 
research and accelerate its transformation into new technologies addressing real-world 
problems that provide the impetus for economic development” (startup proposal, July 21, 
2007). Specifically, this model would increase IT research and commercialization by: 
• Broadening the scope of IT research by expanding the disciplinary boundaries 
• Addressing real world problems with foundational research 
• Nurturing new connections in an entrepreneurial culture. 
This new platform, the PIs wrote, would attract national and transnational companies to bring 
their projects to ISU, make ISU more competitive in securing large-scale grants, help recruit 
and retain IT faculty, and increase the impact of ISU’s research on Iowa’s economy (start-up 
proposal, July 21, 2006). In short, they described ITI as “the bridge [italics added] that is 
currently missing between academic IT research that is the engine [italics added] of 
innovation and industry-led commercialization and entrepreneurial activity that is essential 
for successful IT-driven economic development in Iowa” (start-up proposal, July 21, 2006). 
These two metaphors—“bridge” and “engine”—positioned the ITI as a new mechanism to 
fix an “old” problem. As shown in Figure 1, the diagram developed to explain the ITI was 
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based on the linear model of Mode 1, adding conduits or “bridges” between academe and 
industry. But the diagram also redefines the “bridge,” describing the links between the two 
spheres in terms of economic benefits. 
 
 
Figure 1: A conceptual model of the ITI (start-up proposal, July 21, 2006). 
  
In addition, this model suggests that the problems associated with the valley of death 
can be fixed by building the right structure. By “bridging” the gap between research and its 
impact, the ITI provides a structure for “accelerating” and “transforming” research into 
tangible benefits. But in fixing those problems, these metaphors suggest a deficiency that 
needs to be remedied and a set of oppositions to be reconciled: between movement and 
stagnation, between applicable and non-applicable results, the tangible and the intangible, 
and the most striking “real world problems” and its implied opposing term. Under these 
terms, the implication is that current practices are too slow to have an impact. In the start-up 
proposal, “bridging the gap” meant accelerating that process by expanding disciplinary 
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boundaries, addressing real world problems, and nurturing partnerships. It also meant 
disrupting the traditional boundaries of who and what is included in the production of 
scientific knowledge. 
As Kay pointed out in the opening vignette, the differences among the research 
directors had a lot to do with two of those five directors pushing the boundaries of traditional 
definitions of research: what does it mean to create presence, a “unifying home,” or “unique 
platform?” According to Burke (1969a), these terms are defined by what they are not. In A 
Grammar of Motives, he called such definition the pun of language—in observing what a 
thing is, its intrinsic value, we refer to it by its context, by that which is outside of or external 
to the thing itself. “And a thing’s context, being outside or beyond the thing, would be 
something that the thing is not” (Burke, 1962, p. 23). In other words, the ITI’s presence and 
value as a “unifying home” and “unique platform” were constituted in context, in relation to 
its exterior, or, in Burke’s terms to what it is not—traditional Mode 1 knowledge production.  
In specifying a presence and value, John’s start-up proposal to Battelle is much like a 
position statement that describes the organization in a field of competing interests. In an 
interview, I asked Guy, the graphic designer, about the purpose of position statements in 
relation an organization’s visual identity or presence. He said: “The position statement is 
supposed to differentiate them from their competition. They are trying to find what it is that 
they do differently so that they can promote themselves to their funders with the goal of 
getting more funding” (interview, May 22, 2008). The differences implied in the metaphors 
used in ITI’s position statement worked to create value and success not only for the 
organization, but for Mode 2 in a field of competing interests as a whole. 
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In Bourdieu’s terms, these metaphors functioned to define and redefine what he 
called space—the set of coexisting positions and relationships inscribed in the social 
categories that describe the space, its practices, goods, and opinions.  
This idea of difference, or a gap, is at the basis of the very notion of space, 
that is, a set of distinct and coexisting positions which are exterior to one 
another and which are defined in relation to one another through the mutual 
exteriority and their relations of proximity, vicinity, or distance, as well as 
through relations of order, such as above, below, and between (Bourdieu, 
1998, p. 8). 
In that mutual exteriority, individuals articulate and read that space through symbols, such as 
language, which describe those positions and their relative economic and cultural value. As 
Bourdieu argued (1998), those sets of differences exist in a state of virtuality, “not as 
something given, but as something to be done” (p. 12). In other words, the terms of a given 
space are under constant negotiation and revision by the individuals involved, each term 
modified and defined in relation to a set of co-existing relations. As a space, economic 
development revised the public good model in two ways. First, it redefined technology 
transfer as cooperative action. Second, it restated the answer to “cui bono?” in terms of 
tangible benefits. In effect, these revisions upset the set of co-existing relations defined under 
Mode 1. 
Economic Development as Cooperative Action 
In many ways, this tension between Mode 1 and Mode 1 knowledge production is 
about boundaries. The ITI was constituted as a set of differences between traditional Mode 1 
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knowledge production and a more entrepreneurial Mode 2 that promoted a problem-based, 
collaborative approach to define a research agenda that spanned disciplines and university 
boundaries. As they were creating an institutional structure, they were also attempting to 
redefine the expert community and the kind of activity in that community. In the interviews, 
the tension surrounding these boundary lines became quite apparent.  
The interviews I conducted took place in March and April, several months after I am 
told that all marketing efforts must come to halt. As the opening vignette described, the 
research directors disagreed with the vision outlined in the ITI’s texts. In the interviews, John 
and Daniel described their differences. In his interview, John told me: 
The vision for the space was that it would be a place where big companies, 
faculty, graduate students, and start-ups would all work together in the same 
place—not necessarily together, but sort of the water cooler talk where you 
find out what people are doing and it causes a synergy to happen (interview, 
March 31, 2008).  
The idea was to create synergy or cooperative action, enacting the presence outlined in the 
proposal. John elaborated on the proposed vision, saying the model was different for two 
reasons. First, the research projects funded via memberships by the larger companies would 
be general enough so that those companies “might pitch in with their potential competitors” 
(interview, March 31, 2008). This line of reasoning follows the cooperate to compete 
narrative that had been taking hold since the 1980s, most recently with calls from 
bureaucracies including the National Science Foundation and state governments to increase 
the intellectual interchange between universities and industry. As Kay told me, “the thing is 
for companies to put problems forward to share because the world is so sophisticated they 
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have to have a quick answer. ITI brings players together. In the past, you would never share 
problems, but now they have to” (field notes, June 11, 2007). In other words, they have to 
cooperate to compete in a globalized marketplace.  
But the model was also different in its vision that the research projects would span the 
skill sets of several of the academic research centers involved with the ITI. Spanning the skill 
sets meant creating teams made up of not only academic researchers, but also of industry 
leaders. John said the goal is to have “six to eight or ten member companies on each of these 
teams and to have lots of different types of projects going on and then continue activity that 
way every year. That’s the goal (interview, March 31, 2008). Cooperate to compete means 
altering the boundaries of both who and what gets included on the research agenda. 
But what does this change in model do to the perceived value of research? When I 
asked Daniel about the value of the proposed for ITI, he responded by saying,  
Well I think the intended value is that we hope it offers a new paradigm for 
the way we interact with industry. It’s kind of a tough sell. Again, it’s back to 
this bottom line and how does whatever we do help the industry, so the goal is 
to try to get to the point where we are helping and working with industry more 
closely on their problems and taking things a little further than just the pure 
research stage. We tend to leave things. Once we’re done with the research, 
we tend to walk away from it. Here the goal is to continue to extend that 
farther and into a more entrepreneurial type of mode. Again that’s tough for 
the university—tough for the university, tough for industry to get used to that 
newer model of us taking it farther down the road than we normally take it 
(interview, April 29, 2008). 
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In Daniel’s view, the “new paradigm” changes how the university has typically interacted 
with industry. This “new paradigm” represents a shift in the rules, structures, and habits that 
have organized research practices since the Cold War regime of funding and managing 
American science. It does so by extending the responsibilities of the researcher to work more 
closely with industry. As Daniel said, this shift in conception is a tough sell—tough for both 
the university and industry. Given the structures that have governed systems of practice, how 
does the organization effect such a change in practices that takes research results “farther 
down the road?” 
Economic Development as a Tangible Benefit 
As I argued in chapter 2, the linear model of basic-to-applied research was 
constructed around a narrative that scientists needed to be left alone to do their work in the 
name of national security and health. Following the Second World War, this narrative 
emerged as a rhetorical style and set of arguments for the autonomy of scientists, creating an 
expert community in the universities that authorized knowledge production as “disinterested” 
agents working for the public good rather than the corporate bottom line. Since then, this 
narrative has worked to rationalize and operationalize “Big Science” and “Big Technology” 
as systems of practice largely underwritten by the federal government. As a system, “expert” 
knowledge is diffused through various channels, including publications and conferences 
organized by the disciplines. In this traditional Mode 1 progression of knowledge, ideas 
move as objectified knowledge from one location to the next. 
But as I discussed, technology transfer as a term emerged in the 1960s as a metaphor 
to describe the benefits of directing substantial federal funds to academic science and 
technology programs. Prior to the 1960s, discussions focused on innovation and the problems 
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associated with “diffusion”—a metaphor, Miller (unpublished) argued, that makes the 
process itself seem relatively agentless (p. 10). The advantage of technology transfer was that 
it activated the model by implying that people were engaged in moving knowledge from its 
source to its destination—knowledge was transferred. This metaphor worked in the 1960s, 
Miller argued, because “the ‘active’ model of transfer is what critics of government R&D 
expenditures needed—a way of guaranteeing that along with federal funds came the active 
responsibility for ensuring that research results would be made use of for public benefit” (p. 
21). As a metaphor, technology transfer grounded the Mode 1 knowledge production by 
making more explicit the idea of linkages between academic research and its impact as a 
public good. 
In the case of the ITI, I looked at the press releases to examine the transfer metaphor 
in this more public forum. In the press releases about the ITI, the discussion surrounding the 
benefits of technology transfer repositioned the public good in terms of economic 
development. For instance, on October 3, 2006, when John Brighton, Iowa State University’s 
vice president for research and economic development, announced awards for $3.69 million 
in state funding for technology and commercialization research at the university, he 
emphasized the potential economic impact of the awards, saying “these research projects will 
help the state reach its goal of creating high-wage, high-growth industries.” And he related 
the projects to ISU’s vision of applying science and technology in the state: “One of the 
university’s priorities is to translate discoveries into economic impacts for the state and the 
world” (Brighton, 2006). That vision included funding for the new Information Technology 
Institute to develop collaborative research and development projects with private industry 
with the publicly announced expectation that it would spin off as many as six start-up 
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companies within five years—a benefit for the state in terms of economic development and 
for the university in relation to opportunities for students and faculty. 
Again, in another press release, the benefits of the $1 million award are stated as 
tangibles: ITI Director John was quoted as calling the ITI “the vehicle…to turn research into 
new licensed technologies and start-ups” (Bzdega, 2008). And as the president of the 
university stated:   
The new Information Technology Institute is very important to the university 
and the state. The institute will build on the university’s strengths in 
information technology. It will develop the expertise and technology that can 
help Iowa companies compete in a global economy. And it will help the state 
create opportunities that can keep talented and educated young people in Iowa 
(Geoffroy, 2007). 
These tangibles are based on building strengths and opportunities that can be counted in 
numbers of licenses and new companies as well as job opportunities for young Iowans. And 
although these outcomes include the overtones of a traditional Mode 1 public good 
narrative—developing expertise and educational benefits—the benefits are couched in a 
cooperate-to-compete, economic development narrative about helping Iowa companies 
compete in a global economy.  
As in the start-up proposal, the rhetorical ground for the ITI is based on the implied 
assumption that this new model is doing work that the “old” model did not do—“leveraging 
its research strengths to benefit the state’s economic development” (Geoffroy, 2007). The 
terms “building” and “leveraging” suggest that research is not used to its full potential. 
Again, the idea is not to replace the old model, but to simply build on that model to 
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“leverage” its potential. Like a mechanical lever, these metaphors about “building” and 
“leveraging” ISU’s current research suggest a simple manipulation in the placement of force 
to apply the more pressure can solve the problem. 
In the start-up proposal and white paper, the PIs developed a narrative that gave the 
institute structure, answering the questions of what will the ITI look like and what will it do. 
In drawing on economic development as a resource, John redistributed the value of academic 
research by enlarging the influence of applied research, calling IT the “driver” and “engine” 
of innovation. Technology, not basic science, is the valued commodity in this narrative. As 
such, Mode 2 de-emphasizes the routines, habits, and regularized social practices organized 
under Mode 1. But how does this new narrative get legitimacy, particularly as it is 
constituted against the Mode 1 narrative that has organized research practices since the end 
of World War II?  
In The Constitution of Society, Giddens (1984) suggested analyzing the conditions 
that govern the continuity or transformation of structures to understand the reproduction of 
social systems. Giddens argued that structure is not external to individuals. Rather structure 
has to do with the rules and resources—the organized properties of social systems—that 
agents draw upon in their interactions. One such resource is language. The directors drew on 
the language of economic development to give their idea shape and power. But, as Giddens 
made clear, structure by itself is marked by an “absence of the subject,” existing out of time 
and space (p. 25). In other words, terms such as economic development get their meaning in 
context as part of situated social systems that have regularized sets of relationships and 
activities. As Faber (2002) argued, “our cultural discourses, meaning the jargon, dialects, 
intonations, vocabularies, and other linguistic features that we use to create and maintain our 
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communities, are important because they make up and reflect the structures that dominate our 
routinized, habitual world” (p. 62). One of the problems for the ITI was a clash interpretive 
frameworks between the language and routines of Mode 1 and Mode 2 as structured 
practices. In the next sections, I consider ethos and audience as structuring principles, 
examining the symbolic power of these resources for negotiating authority. 
Structuring Principles: Ethos 
In Aristotle’s tripartite scheme (logos, pathos, ethos), ethos is the persuasive appeal of 
the speaker to his or her audience, which judges the speaker’s credibility by their perceptions 
of that speaker’s character. “For it is not the case, as some of the handbook writers propose in 
their treatment of the art, that fair-mindedness on the part of the speaker makes no 
contribution to persuasiveness; rather, character is almost, so to speak, the most authoritative 
form of persuasion” (Aristotle, 2007, p. 39). Since Aristotle, the definition of ethos has 
expanded to include more than making the speaker’s character “look right” (p. 112). While 
the speaker in Aristotle’s time was a citizen representing himself in civic affairs, the speaker 
in technology transfer today is often the voice of the organization. Researchers, such as 
Halloran (1982) and Hunt (1986), have separately expanded Aristotle’s definition of ethos 
from an appeal based on an individual’s character to that of an organization’s character, 
drawing on the Greek meaning of ethos as “a habitual gathering place” (Halloran, 1982, p. 
60), or a public space where communal values and collective acts inform how the audience 
perceives character and credibility.  
To understand ethos as a structuring resource, I analyzed the ITI’s ethos through the 
term motive. For Burke (1954), motive is a term of interpretation: “When introspecting to 
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find the explanation for his attitudes, he would naturally employ the verbalizations of his 
group—for what are his language and thought if not a socialized product?” (p. 20). To 
analyze ethos through motive means understanding organizational character not as a response 
to a situation as one might “dress for success,” but rather as constituting the communal 
values and collective acts as they are externalized in language. As Burke (1954) argued, 
motives are shorthand words for situations (p. 31). In this way, ethos as a persuasive appeal 
is not “put on,” but is rather an appeal to an interpreted collective value. As an appeal, ethos 
draws upon a set of interests of actors and their motives within a field of action. 
The following vignette underscores the divisions within the ITI. As it indicates, ethos 
and power were interrelated. In this section, I present my analysis of the ways in which ethos 
was used to establish a structure a rhetorical ground that authorized Mode 2 and why those 
grounds failed to act as a place of identification for the ITI. 
Vignette II: Flattening the Power Structure 
Kay said that she thinks ITI is going to take off this summer. She said that 
now that power has been flattened, that John is not seen as controlling the 
organization, other members have stepped up. She said that the lack of 
consensus early on really took the wind out of his sails. But, now that the 
power issues are taken care of the group has jelled and John is really 
beginning to pick up the economic development piece. The others really don’t 
care about that piece. They are working on the research part.  
Field notes, April 22, 2008 
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I talked to Kay about the possibility of writing a newsletter for ITI. She said 
the trouble is that not all the directors are not on the same page as to what the 
organization should be doing. Some days she feels good about the group—it 
has cohesion. Other days she thinks they have nothing in common. 
Field notes, June 10, 2008 
As I read through my field notes, I could not help but notice the back and forth 
speculation about whether the institute would survive. In meetings with Kay, we occasionally 
revisited the idea of going ahead with a newsletter or other marketing piece to make the 
organization more visible. But other than revisions to its website, very little was done to 
market the ITI. As Kay said, the group had difficulty figuring out what it wanted to be—
some days the directors were on the same page, other days they had nothing in common. In 
that back and forth, the directors did two things to try to build consensus. First, they 
organized different councils within the organization, splitting the responsibilities between the 
research and economic development components. Second, they decided to hire three post-
doctorates to act as liaisons between the research centers and to coordinate activity with 
industry. These two actions were seen as having a “flattening” effect. But even these actions 
failed to move the organization forward. It was in perpetual identity crisis, largely surviving 
on rhetorical hype. The directors disagreed on the identity constituted in the texts that were 
helping to will the organization into existence—the website in particular. The space, or 
rhetorical ground, which “grounded” the ITI, became a point of contention. At issue seemed 
to be the authority of the external representation of the organization—its projected ethos.  
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An Entrepreneurial Ethos 
In its very early stages, the ITI had to not only outline the structure of the 
organization, but it also had to build confidence in and support for the project. It had to 
establish its credibility for being able to take the organization from an idea to sustainability. 
To see how the ITI understood its ethos in relation to its audiences, I looked at the start-up 
proposal and the white paper for the ways ethos grounded the organization. In these 
documents, the ITI’s ethos draws on the concept of an entrepreneurial, market-driven culture 
associated with both initiative and risk. Throughout these materials, the ITI is defined as 
“innovative” and groundbreaking, providing a new way and a “unique platform to pioneer 
[italics added] new ways for universities to solve today’s complex challenges” (start-up 
proposal, July 21, 2006). As pioneering, the organization is positioned as taking risks with 
the potential for high returns.  
The ITI also appealed to tradition, stating in the start-up proposal that the 
organization “builds on six well-established but independent IT research centers” (start-up 
proposal, July 21, 2006). In doing so, it specifically highlighted ETAC’s work as an example 
of ISU’s “tradition of fostering IT-based economic development, spanning startups to long-
term relationships with established regional industries” (start-up proposal, July 21, 2006). In 
this example, the appeal to “tradition” and ETAC’s success moderates the newness of the ITI 
by showing that such work can be done. In doing so, the ITI was positioned as an innovative 
“bridge” to transform results into tangible outcomes. As John said, “we want to infuse the 
entrepreneurial, cross-cultural nature of ETAC to other groups” (field notes, October 3, 
2007). But, in the interviews, the predominant metaphor changed from building bridges to 
the “bottom line.” 
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As shown in Vignette II, the ITI continued to struggle to move beyond envisioning 
the possibilities. Throughout the interviews, the explanations for this struggle had to do with 
the “selling” and “buying into” the model proposed. As Kay said in her interview:  
It will be interesting to see what happens with ITI. People haven’t bought into 
it: they aren’t committed to its success, they didn’t like how it was initially 
developed, and they aren’t in agreement in how to spend the money. So all 
those things could end up killing it (interview, March 17, 2008).  
In large part, that lack of “buy in” had to do with a perception that John and his staff at 
ETAC were taking over the organization. As Kay said in her interview, 
ETAC is huge—we’ve got a great reputation, the staff to support it, and I 
think John is a nice guy. He’s the type that when Brighton says I want to do 
this, John says okay. Whereas the rest would say we can’t do it for these ten 
reasons, John says we can do it for these ten reasons, and so he’s the kind of 
guy someone would want to go to. The problem is that John can’t get the other 
centers to be on the same page, not even with each other and it’s really 
frustrating. They are really unhappy about the building. They are really 
unhappy about the money being diverted to support the space at the research 
park (interview, March 17, 2008). 
In many ways, John was the right person to initiate an organization such as the ITI. Because 
of his experience as director of ETAC, he knew how to collaborate with industry and across 
disciplines. And even though two of the “unhappy” research directors were faculty members 
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of ETAC, they resisted their position in the ITI. What difference did this change in position 
make? 
In many ways, the difference seemed to be one of status. As faculty members of 
ETAC, their individual research programs were supported through ETAC’s resources. But as 
directors of ITI, their individual research programs were called on to play the supporting role, 
and they did not like that structure. For one, they disliked the hierarchy that seemed to be in 
place. As Kay told me, “I think this group is annoyed because they don’t think John is an 
expert from the publications and refereed journals perspective to be in the right position to be 
the director of this institute” (interview, March 17, 2008). Although John is a full professor at 
the university, his work at ETAC was considered ‘second tier’ or one step removed from 
‘foundational’ research. John was acting the role of a Mode 2 leader, but his colleagues 
seemed to dismiss him because he did not have Mode 1 credentials. The entrepreneurial 
ethos was too dominant. Even though the entrepreneurial ethic followed the categories 
inscribed in Mode 1’s linear model of research, it redistributed the relative value of basic 
versus applied research. It was a change in motive or the interpreted values of these 
categories, particularly in relation to its authorizing power. 
In her interview, Kay told me that this problem had persisted ever since ITI received 
its start-up grant from the state:  
The money was received, but none of the centers at that point had been asked 
for their opinion. They had not been part of the process. When things started 
falling down, it was pretty much just a John thing, and Brighton said you 
know we’re going to have to sell the concept now that it’s been funded. These 
center directors are pretty independent and autonomous with a pretty good 
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idea of what they want done, and number one, they didn’t like all those things 
decided without them being a part of it. But now hey we’d like you to be a 
part of this ITI. I think that is there now. We are still in that process 
(interview, March 17, 2008). 
From the very beginning, several of the research centers occupied a marginal position, a 
place they did not like. As Kay said, the directors are independent and autonomous. In some 
ways, they did not seem to know how to enact the role of researchers in a cooperate to 
compete scenario. In his interview, John talked about this internal dynamic: 
We’ve been going around and around on how to spend a certain portion of the 
budget which was set aside for research. And, it’s a substantial amount of 
money. The last three meetings have been trying to decide how best to spend 
this money…. I’ve been reluctant to lead because my style is one that if I’m 
not getting any input or feedback is to do what I think is best and then I 
sometimes get accused of being unilateral. So in this most recent round I sort 
of took a back seat (interview, March 31, 2008). 
In selling the concept internally, John struggled to reconcile competing interests from within 
and seemed to be constantly fighting the impression that he was acting in his own interests. 
The response to his gestures seemed to be one of retrenchment, indicating a lack of “buy in” 
to the proposed model. In an interview, Mark (the science writer) said, “most of these 
research directors come up as faculty members and probably not necessarily entrepreneurial 
faculty members. They are not John…. Entrepreneurship is not on their radar at all” 
(interview, May 19, 2008). The directors did not know how to act together in this model. 
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To help facilitate their actions, the ITI retooled the internal structure to help build 
consensus among the research directors. As I mentioned earlier in the chapter, it separated 
the research component from that of economic development and assigned the directors to one 
side or the other. As John said,  
We have proposed and have nominally started acting on a more or less 
functional organization where we have three of us leaders are aimed at 
defining the research, three are aimed at economic development, and three are 
aimed at educational, academic type things, and I can’t remember the fourth 
category (interview, March 31, 2008) 
As a way to manage the disagreement, they structured the organization around the divisions 
that underscored their predicament. As Kay said,  
I have this piece of paper that says research council, economic development. 
They divided up power among the center directors. So John can’t say how the 
$250k is going to be spent. He’s not in charge anymore of that. I wouldn’t say 
his directorship is meaningless at this point to him, but it was the only way 
that they could get the directors to engage (interview, March 17, 2008). 
This new organizational structure was put in place to “flatten” the perceived hierarchy in 
which John and ETAC were seen as making all decisions on behalf of the organization. Kay 
told me that this “flattening” effect gave the organization a way to move forward, to build 
what she called consensus. 
In Mode 2, knowing how to act together is a challenge because the range of actors 
destabilizes the roles that these actors have traditionally played in Mode 1. As Nowotny et al. 
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(2001) stated, in Mode 2 “other actors, once dismissed as mere ‘disseminators’, ‘brokers’ or 
‘users’ of research results, are now more actively involved in their ‘production’” (p. 89). One 
of the characteristics of Mode 2 knowledge production is its rather diffuse power structure. 
As Nowotny et al. (2001) stated, in Mode 2 “there is a high degree of uncertainty; there is no 
clear-cut direction but many competing ideas, theories and methods; and no one is in overall 
charge” (p. 115). In Mode 2, the heroes in science and technology change, moving from 
individuals to organizations as the key agents in the transfer of knowledge, creating a much 
more distributed model for maintaining, evaluating, and exchanging knowledge as capital. As 
Kinsella (2005) noted, “contemporary science and technology are characterized by 
unprecedented degrees of institutionalization, and that in these settings the locus of agency 
has increasingly shifted from the individual to larger systems of power/knowledge” (p. 302). 
These shifts, Kinsella contended, make organizations and their activities—identifying 
research questions, producing methodological standards, writing peer reviews, and funding 
research—the primary social actors rather than individual scientists. 
Representations of Space: The Website as a Primary Mode of Ethos  
The differences among the research directors can also be described as boundary work 
or the protection of the symbolic space. As Gieryn (1983) explained, boundary work of 
scientists is “their attribution of selected characteristics to the institution of science (i.e., to its 
practitioners, methods, stock of knowledge, values and work organization) for purposes of 
constructing a social boundary that distinguishes some intellectual activities as ‘non-
science’” (p. 782). That boundary between science and “non-science” includes divisions 
between basic science and its application to problems in the “real world.” The projected 
ethos as set forward in the ITI’s texts revised Mode 1’s social boundaries. The website in 
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particular became a site of boundary work and an object for demarcation, most notably when 
additions were proposed in preparation for a board meeting in November 2007.  
Although several of ITI’s research directors disagreed with the ITI’s stated mission 
from the beginning, the divisions among the research center directors flared in November 
when John hosted the first and only Industrial Advisory Board meeting for the ITI in ETAC’s 
conference room. Preparations for the meeting began in September with invitations to a 
handful of corporations for the purpose of formulating an effective strategy to engage 
industry in the ITI. To prepare for that meeting, the marketing team was asked to include a 
page on the ITI’s website with a picture and bio of the industrial board members. This page 
was meant to complement the already existing page about the research center directors who 
were involved in the ITI. But the industrial board member page never went live. By 
November, the undercurrent between the research center directors about the role of the 
industrial leaders had become too strong. When the Industrial Advisory Board meeting was 
held, tensions among the research directors were high, particularly over the role that this 
body should have in the operations of a university institute. By December 2007, I am told all 
marketing was put on hold—the research directors could not agree on leadership or vision. 
Without those elements, how could we market the organization to external audiences? 
As a public document, the ITI’s website was a statement of identity. As a rhetorical 
actor, the website was the ITI’s primary mode of ethos—it stood in for the organization’s 
character, articulating a set of identifications. In essence, it is a stabilized version of the 
organization, and like business cards and letterhead, an integral part of an organization’s 
identity—a must-have for a new organizations to announce it is in business.  
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When the ITI was formally announced in May 2007, the website included mission 
statement language taken directly from the start-up proposal and white paper. It also included 
bios and pictures of each research center director. The opening statement on the home page 
read: 
Motivated by the increasing pace of advances in information sciences and 
technologies, the ITI is a new institute that brings together interdisciplinary 
research teams to enhance research competitiveness and to collaborate with 
industrial partners. These partnerships span the spectrum from start-ups to 
well-established companies with a regional presence, expanding the capacity 
for foundational research and new technologies to address real-world 
problems in areas as diverse as the biological sciences, agriculture, 
engineering, and business (website, March 2007). 
The mission was to research and collaborate. By November, other pages included “About 
Us” and “News and Events.”  When working on the initial site, I had understood that the 
directors agreed it would be a good idea to identify several research foci that the centers 
could pursue collectively. But that text was difficult to develop. Prior to the November 
meeting, that idea resurfaced. Kay asked me to work with John to modify the site’s content—
the other research center directors felt the site was not “researchy” enough (field notes, 
October 3, 2007). The problem was identifying a project that would exemplify the ITI’s 
mission. The proposed addition to include the industrial advisory board members on the 
website seemed to tip the delicate balance between the research and economic development 
sides of the organization. 
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Indeed, in looking at the websites of the dissenting research directors, their work is 
clearly positioned as ‘foundational.’ For instance, one center described its mission as 
addressing the university’s  “research and educational needs in accordance with the land-
grant mission of the university” (website). Another represented its mission with a diagram 
(Figure 2) that placed their research as the beginning or starting point for the transfer of 
knowledge. 
 
Figure 2: A schematic of research as the top of the hierarchy. 
 
A third research center described its purpose as providing the foundation and 
fundamentals for advancement. They too included a diagram of their role in advancing 
knowledge (Figure 3), placing their work at the center of knowledge production with 
academic research acting as a foundation or base. On its website, this graphic is explained as 
the research center “pursues fundamental research and research-based advanced training.” In 
addition, its “ core faculty have significant breadth and depth of expertise” who “are engaged 
in transformative research on cyber-enabled discovery in collaboration with their colleagues 
in several areas. Some of this research is leading to fundamental advances.” 
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Figure 3: A schematic of technology transfer in which academic subjects are depicted at the 
base of all other activity, providing a foundation for the process of discovery. 
 
All three of these research centers construct similar boundaries around their work 
within the public good/learning regime. In many ways, the projected ethos comes from its 
distance from a larger social context. Giddens (1990) called this mechanism disembedding or 
“the ‘lifting out’ of social relations from local contexts of interaction” (p. 21), a detachment 
from private interests that may have undue influence on the results. And, even though these 
research centers all proclaimed to engage in collaborative work, that collaboration is strictly 
within the boundaries of the university and funders such as the National Science Foundation. 
In all three instances, the research centers listed collaborative partners that extended to other 
universities and funding agencies, but all were within the discipline and none included 
industrial partners. Collaboration in this sense is defined as ‘inside’ disciplinary boundaries, 
within the expert community. 
In addition, the research centers described their contact with the private sector strictly 
in terms of providing education and training. For instance, one research center stated that it 
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provides “research-based training opportunities in cyber-enabled discovery to a diverse cadre 
of graduate and undergraduate students.” A second research center also outlined its 
involvement in relation to education and training: 
[The research center] is making impacts in education and industry on 
statewide and national levels by enhancing learning and scholarship, 
providing guidance and continuing education opportunities to industry 
professionals, addressing the needs of IT professionals, and promoting the 
development of new IT technologies and their applications.  
In all of these descriptions, the emphasis is on the university as the locus of expertise, as the 
starting point and foundation for new technological developments.  
As such, these texts describe a social space and the connections and responsibilities of 
its actors to other social spaces. The ITI’s projected ethos disrupted that description by 
including and even privileging “non-science” activities in the boundaries that have 
traditionally structured how work gets done in the academy. But as Gieryn (1983) argued, 
such boundary work is a rhetorical style, concluding that different rhetorical goals call for 
different rhetorical styles. For instance, to expand authority or expertise into other domains, 
the rhetor’s repertoire may include oppositions that heighten the contrast between rivals (p. 
792). As a rhetorical style, contrast between rivals was quite evident in the ways each 
interpreted the cultural values or ethos of the other.  
In the interview, I asked John about these tensions over the role of the industry 
leaders. When I asked John whether the issue was about industry funds “tainting” research, 
he replied: 
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I don’t think that it is that so much as a sort of natural rift within university of 
basic versus applied research and the people who value one over the other. So 
the people who are primarily funded by the NSF for instance would think that 
industry work is not interesting enough. First of all, industry would fund you 
to work on a specific problem, not necessarily whatever you like. So they are 
calling the shots as opposed to you. Even though it is contract research, they 
can’t force you to do anything—they just won’t fund you again.  
Second, it is also that, I don’t know what the issue is generally, but that it is a 
sort of a second class type of support, that these are problems that are too near 
term, too pedestrian to get PhD material to work out of, even though we do it 
all the time at ETAC. So it’s sort of a natural kind of division in the university 
and I think you see it in our group (interview, March 31, 2008). 
For John, the issue of industry funds is not necessarily about tainting the research as invalid. 
Rather it has to do with a structural difference relating to who decides what counts as a 
problem. And the issue seemed to be about keeping that hierarchy in place, what John called 
a “natural rift between basic and applied research.” Contract research is considered “second 
class.” In his interview, Daniel reiterated this view by saying, “some people view company 
money as being substandard money. All money is green, but some money is greener. NSF 
and those moneys are considered to be better moneys” (interview, April 29, 2008). This tier 
is considered “uninteresting” and “too pedestrian” in value and worth. 
In many ways, these tiers of funding, the greenness of money, described a social 
position and the economic and cultural power of that position. In his explanation of the 
difference in social spaces, Bourdieu (1998) argued that the “position occupied in social 
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space, that is, in the structure of the distribution of different kinds of capital, which are also 
weapons, commands the representations of this space and the position-takings in the 
struggles to conserve or transform it” (p. 12). As the directors worked to structure ITI, they 
maintained the categories that describe the distribution of capital in the linear model, but 
revised the relative positions in the representation of that space. Inscribed in that space were 
distinctions and differences in practices and goods. As Bourdieu (1998) said, these symbolic 
differences constitute a language, a set of distinctive features that “constitute a mythical 
system, that is as distinctive signs” (p. 9). In the case of the ITI, the distinctions between 
basic and applied science described a social space full of symbols that inscribed the 
distribution of capital and its relative worth. 
Ethos as Spatial 
In the last section, I considered ethos in relation to the symbolic attributes that 
delineate the boundaries of science. In this section, I analyze ethos as a spatial dimension to 
further my argument that keys terms that describe the social structure are not just stylistic 
devices, rather they become the substance of the discourse, a part of the regularized routines 
and habits, institutionalized in practical matters such as how the money gets spent, who gets 
to lead, and what the vision/mission of the organization should be. As substance, the ITI’s 
entrepreneurial ethos realigned the economic and cultural value attributed to basic research 
and its technological application, and on a practical level, getting all of the research directors 
to buy into the space it created became a problem.  
It was problematic for two reasons. First, the dissenting research directors had no 
incentive to fully commit to the ITI, and second, there seemed to be a general discomfort 
with the spatial relationships its membership entailed. As Kay said,  
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I think each one of them comes to the ITI from the perspective of their own 
center. What would it take to my center successful and in turn ITI successful? 
They can’t get past their own center to determine what would make ITI 
successful. I think it is because ITI has very little value or impact. They 
wouldn’t view that as offensive but just their honest opinion (interview, 
March 17, 2008). 
The dissenting directors failed to see the benefit to their individual programs. In her 
interview, Kay speculated what it would take to get the research directors to buy into the 
model. “If the center director’s could feel there is an incentive—for them it has to be tangible 
money or extra grants—they would buy into it. But I don’t think they see any of that yet” 
(interview, March 17, 2008). The irony of the situation was that the ITI as a space was 
physically and rhetorically structuring as a “trading zone” for different groups with different 
interests to come together to get things done, but that common ground held little interest to 
those who constituted its core. It was not so much that they failed to understand the language. 
The dissenting research directors did seem to grasp the situation. The language provided the 
coordinates for cooperation, but the directors failed to see the incentive. 
But in addition to lack of incentive, there was also a lack of comfort with the model, 
not necessarily on an ideological level, but on a practical one—it was an uncomfortable place 
for some people to be. In his interview, Daniel said to me: 
The model is kind of ambitious because most centers here on campus are 
singularly focused typically on research. This center has not only that as its 
mission but also the economic development piece as its mission makes it a 
little more challenging. Not all faculty are comfortable with the economic 
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development piece of the mission…. Very few centers have played on that 
path. There are a few. But it’s an uncomfortable place for a lot of people to be 
(interview, April 29, 2008). 
Daniel pointed out that the model is rather ambitious because it is an unknown to the faculty 
who have been asked to “play on that path.” Expanding the mission from research to include 
economic development was not something they necessarily knew how to do. Likewise, Mike 
noted the discomfort factor in his assessment of the difficulties this model faces:  
I wonder if these people would tell you this or not, but I think this whole 
economic development piece is something that most of these, you know the 
Bloedels and Brightons, aren’t necessarily comfortable with. They are the VP 
of research and they have to deal with economic development so they have to 
make the best of it. So I think there is still some, there’s just discomfort in 
academia dealing with economic development. But, that is the reality 
(interview, May 19, 2008). 
In his explanation, this economic activity, entrepreneurship is not in their realm of 
experience. Although they may be good researchers, they have no experience outside of the 
“basic” research realm as it has been traditionally defined. As Bourdieu would say, they have 
no “feel for the game”—the acquired system of preferences that orient the perception of and 
response to a situation (p. 25). Perhaps this discomfort has to do with “economic 
development” as asking them to switch sides in the sets of oppositions that have structured 
traditional practices since the end of the Second World War. The “economic development” 
narrative alters the marks of distinction and the ways in which the “playing field” is read and 
interpreted.  
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But what is most striking about these explanations about the economic development 
model is that they retain the structure of the linear model. Structurally, the ways in which 
John and Daniel talked about the proposal model for ITI simply enlarged the arena in which 
faculty are expected to take responsibility. At the same time, however, their 
conceptualization also shifted the focal point, moving the key justification from public good 
to economic development. As Burke would say, this movement in focal point constitutes a 
different terministic screen. For Burke (1966), terministic screens shape “the range of 
observations implicit in a given terminology” (p. 50). While Burke used the analogy of a 
color filter on a camera lens that creates a different photo of the same object to describe 
terministic screens, I am also reminded of the drawing “Draughtsman Drawing a Nude, 
1538” by Albrecht Durer (1471–1528), a German painter, draughtsman, and engraver known 
for his prints and drawings, particularly because of his technical skill and subject matter. 
Aside from the aesthetic of his work, Durer is interesting because he and others (including 
Da Vinci) were playing with perspective and proportions, using grids and other devices to 
render linear perspective on a flat page. 
 
Figure 4: “Draughtsman Drawing a Nude, 1538” by Albrecht Durer. 
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In Durer’s drawing, the draftsman’s perspective is mediated by the grid. Like a 
terministic screen, the grid directs, deflects, and reflects reality. But, as Haraway (1997) 
argued, these perspective devices are “the artifacts with which we convince ourselves our 
histories are true” (p. 180). By applying “real” methods, such as the screen in the drawing, 
that sorts the data points, chaos can be ordered and the natural can be “real.” The draftsman 
can “see” his subject just as the scientist sees the object. The line of sight is mediated by the 
visual technology providing focus and point of view. In the case of the ITI, the conflict 
among the research directors was largely a struggle to control the perspective device that 
stabilizes the activity. In other words, whose metaphor dominates? As Haraway (2007) 
argued, “Durer’s engraving attests to the power of the technology of perspective to discipline 
vision to produce a new kind of knowledge of form” (p. 180). Like Durer’s drawing, the line 
between pornography and art, non-science and science is paradigmatically constructed. For 
Haraway, power had to do with the someone or something that directs the focal point, and 
hence gets to name and label the categories for knowing.  
For the ITI, power was about whose vision was adopted or which perspective was the 
measure of success. In her interview, Kay summarized the situation as: 
I think the group was very supportive of ITI, but each has a very narrow, 
different view of what that success would be. I think they would tell you it’s 
not a power struggle, but a difference in vision. But when they have a 
difference in vision, they use their power to make sure another vision isn’t 
adopted (interview, March 17, 2008). 
In this quote, I am reminded of Burke’s neurotic, the disassociated self in which antagonistic 
terms are in conflict with one another. But even as those terms confront one another, they 
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“can be said to ‘cooperate’ in the building of an overall form” (Burke, 1969b, p. 23). As Kay 
said, the struggle was over whose vision is adopted, each drawing on their resources to make 
sure the other’s vision was not. For each, the projected ethos reflects the understanding of the 
situation, the interpretations, an expression of reality and the data points that are literally and 
figuratively gridded: an entrepreneurial ethic that expands the field of agency to include 
those outside the university or a research ethic that values the autonomy of the scientific 
community as experts.  
A Structuring Resource: Audience 
As I argued in previous chapters, technology transfer is often conceptualized as linear 
movement, in which information is transferred across boundary lines from one entity to the 
next. In the previous section, I analyzed the ways in which the ITI’s entrepreneurial ethic 
drew on this model, upsetting the traditional hierarchical relationships between basic and 
applied research. And I argued that ethos represents an understanding of the situation, 
providing local coordinates that allow audiences to visualize how they fit into the situation. 
In this section, I examine audience as a co-constituent in the ways technology transfer is 
conceptualized. As Bourdieu (1991) argued, “the conditions of reception envisaged are part 
of the conditions of production, and anticipation of the sanctions of the market helps to 
determine the market of the discourse” (p. 76–77). All expressions are marked by an 
anticipation of what is acceptable. It is this anticipation of the acceptable, not a rational 
calculation toward maximizing symbolic profits, that determines not only the choice or level 
of language, but also what is possible or not possible to say. In this way, the audience does 
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not stand apart from textual production. Rather, the audience is embedded in the persuasive 
appeal. 
In this case, however, the audience failed to fully participate in terms put forward by 
the ITI. We often think of audience as external, sitting in front of the speaker listening 
silently and intently to what is being said. But as the ITI found, it also had an internal 
audience that was also a necessary constituent of ITI’s organization. The rhetorical grounds 
put forward by the ITI to its external audience presented a motive or interpretation of the 
situation that several directors resisted. As I discussed earlier in the chapter, the metaphors 
including “unifying home” and “unique platform” referenced a new kind of space for 
material action. But these metaphors were more than stylistic devices. They were also 
visualization technologies. As Haraway (1997) said: “figurations are condensed maps of 
whole worlds” (p. 179). They allow people to “see” the space and where they fit. As such, 
they embody the values, norms, and habits of a given field, epitomizing the tensions between 
Bourdieu’s (1991) conditions of reception and production. 
But, figures are powerful because they draw on formal patterns, such as antithesis, 
that invite the audience to participate. In technology transfer, the arguments that underscore 
the oppositions between Mode 1 and Mode 2 are powerful because the audience can co-
construct the divisions that stand under the discourse. Burke (1969b) described this form as a 
“collaborative expectancy” (p. 58), which, because the audience can readily grasp the 
construction, they can easily participate. In A Rhetoric of Motives, Burke (1969b) described 
the form as follows: 
Imagine a passage built about a set of oppositions (‘we do this, but they on the 
other had do that; we stay here, but they go there; we look up, but they look 
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down,’ etc.). Once you grasp the trend of the form, it invites participation 
regardless of the subject matter. Formally, you find yourself swinging along 
with the succession of antitheses, even though you may not agree with the 
proposition that is being presented in this form. Or it may even be an 
opponent’s proposition which you resent—yet for the duration of the 
statement itself you might ‘help him out’ to the extent of yielding to the 
formal development, surrendering to its symmetry as such (p. 58). 
In this passage, Burke described antitheses as having a certain rhythm with recognizable 
successions of statements. Burke (1969b) went on to say, however, that some forms are 
stronger, because they are more agreeable, than others. Even though the audience may 
surrender to the symmetry, to the rhythm of statements, it may reject the form—the weaker 
the agreement, the weaker the surrender.  
For the ITI, the succession of statements that gave the organization form failed to 
resonate with several of its members—they failed to surrender to its symmetry. Why did the 
rhetorical ground or space built around the ITI fail to bring the participants together? As 
Burke (1954) said, just because something should be of interest, does not mean that someone 
will be interested. As I quoted Daniel in the last section, the ITI was “a tough sell” 
(interview, 4/29/08). What the ITI had to “sell” was not objects, but a dynamic. In this 
section, I examine the role of audience in defining technology transfer particularly in relation 
to the problems with Mode 2 as a rhetorical space for coordinating the interests of different 
people with different needs. This last vignette from my field notes frames my analysis 
because it is an early articulation of how the key participants in ITI’s organization 
conceptualized both the audience and its relationship to that audience. Following this 
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vignette, I discuss the ways in which this audience restructured the value of technology 
transfer by redefining its terms. 
Vignette III: Can You Hear Me Now? 
We met today to talk about writing a newsletter for the ITI. Kay told 
me that the audience is mostly external to the university—people who give, 
people who want to give. It’s all about selling the invisible. The goal is to get 
some energy, to make ITI look dynamic. Kay’s question: How do we let 
people know it’s an invitation to them, an opportunity to collaborate, that ITI 
is facilitating that cooperation. She went on to say, ITI brings players together. 
How do you say, yes, we’re ready? ...ITI can do it. But, it’s got to do it 
quickly. We don’t want the [industry leader] sitting out there all by himself 
waiting for this thing to take off. 
Field notes, October 4, 2007 
Early on in ITI’s organization, I was told that the marketing materials had to tell a 
success story. As the above vignette indicates, selling that success meant selling the 
invisible—a dynamic, an energy, and a set of relationships for cooperative action. The 
question was, as Kay asked, how do we let people know we are ready. As she went on to say 
in my field notes, “companies don’t want to come in to build a collaborative environment. 
They want to come in and solve problems” (field notes, October 4, 2007). At this very early 
stage, “building” the institute meant establishing relationships, primarily with Iowa’s 
corporate sector. 
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But the ITI focused on this external audience for a very practical reason—it needed to 
get into cash flow. The ITI had invested a significant portion of its start-up funds on renting 
office space, what the ITI called its Technical Collaboration Facility, near the university’s 
research park. In his interview, Daniel explained to me: “the bottom line is that it has to be 
self-sufficient in some number of years in order for it to continue” (interview, 4/29/08). It 
planned to do so by renting space in the Technical Collaboration Facility to small start-up 
companies and by selling research memberships to larger companies. As Kay said in the 
vignette above, the target audience was “people who give, people who want to give” (field 
notes, October 4, 2007). But the ITI had to get players together quickly. It had to create the 
dynamic and momentum to make the organization sustainable. The rhetorical exigency was 
defined in relation to self-sufficiency and the steps needed to get there because the initial 
start-up funds would not last indefinitely.  
But, the irony of the vision that was put forward— “a new home” and a “unique 
platform” — was that very little cooperative action was going on. These metaphors suggest a 
certain unity. They hold the promise of unifying discordant practices, referencing a kind of 
trading zone, in which various interests co-mingle to get work done. Introduced by Galison 
(1997), trading zones coordinate action and belief among different traditions: “a site—partly 
symbolic and partly spatial—at which the local coordination between beliefs and action takes 
place” (p. 784). In his history of 20th century physics, Galison (1997) examined three distinct 
subgroups — theorists, experimentalists, and engineers—who worked together in the 
weapons laboratories of World War II. Galison’s trading zone represented a space for these 
distinct groups to come together at the same time as they retained their separate identities and 
practices. Like Burke’s doctrine of consubstantiation, trading zones recognize groups as at 
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once together and apart, allowing autonomy and interconnection. For Galison (1997), 
cultures in interaction can agree on rules of exchange despite vast global differences. In the 
case of the ITI, agreeing on the rules of exchange was a problem for two interrelated reasons. 
First, as I discussed, Mode 2 tends to collapse traditional power structures, and second, Mode 
2 tends to situate knowledge production within social, economic and cultural contexts. For 
the ITI, that contextualization rearticulated the terms of exchange. 
Mode 2: Contextualizing Knowledge Production 
With a shift in agency from individuals to larger systems of knowledge production 
comes a different conceptualization of the relationship between academic research and those 
‘outside’ the university. Mode 2 represents a broader engagement with society, 
contextualizing research agendas within larger social systems. This broader contextualization 
of academic research brings into question what activities now have a “research” component. 
As a consequence, it is hard to distinguish between the categories that have traditionally 
defined research, complicating the role of audience.  
For one, the state took on a larger role in defining the scope of the ITI and its 
activities. John described the conflict to me as follows: 
I think there is a general perception among my colleagues that my emphasis 
has been on economic development and industry outreach and entrepreneurial 
activity and all that, whereas the mission of the ITI is to strengthen our 
research capacity. I’ve always agreed with that. It’s a matter of chicken and 
the egg. For me, the funding came from the state with a economic 
development mandate and that’s where I’ve focused the most time certainly 
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and my colleagues with a research bent are convinced that small projects for 
them and their friends will inspire new research and that has been a tough 
battle to fight too. So it’s been a struggle (interview, March 31, 2008). 
For John, it is a matter of which comes first: research as the foundation for defining problems 
and methods or the broader context of application that drives the research? Which approach 
is to stabilize the research agenda?  
This metaphor also extended to the role that industry was asked to play in the model 
put forward by the ITI. In his interview, Daniel referred to a need to enroll company support 
to make the organization viable. He said: 
In a few years, I think we need to basically have enough companies to have a 
critical mass of being able to support people that we need to have. It’s a little 
bit of a chicken and egg. You got to have some people there who you can rely 
on to get things done, but you can’t afford to pay the people until you get 
some companies to come in with some work. So it’s sort of balancing act. If 
we reached the point where we had enough income to maintain a staff of 
students that did the work, so when somebody new comes on, they are able to 
slot right in and continue that process, then I think we’d be closer to being 
successful at that point. 
In other words, the internal and external components need to be built simultaneously. ITI 
staff and company support need to act in conjunction to be able to balance or stabilize the 
process toward sustainability.  
But in trying to establish this “new home” and “unique platform”—a trading zone for 
conducting the business of science and technology—the role of these external audiences 
 109
continued to drive a wedge between the entrepreneurial and traditional modes of knowledge 
production. Throughout the interviews, I continued to get the sense that several of the 
research directors were not committed to developing these partnerships. But for the ITI, this 
internal resistance to the model made it difficult to bring in external players. In my interview 
with Guy, the graphic designer, about the ITI’s organizational identity, he said,  
It’s an unknown even inside the inner circle. They can’t agree as to what it is, 
where it should go in the tight circle of the five research groups that are there. 
So how are they going to present a positive image to the corporate 
environment they are trying to connect with and also the public in general, the 
taxpayers who support it? They’ve got a long, long uphill battle (interview, 
May 22, 2008). 
Presenting that positive image continued to be problematic for the ITI. As Nowotny et al. 
(2001) argued, the change of context necessitated by Mode 2 is often met with resistance, 
with many scientists believing “they are engaged in nothing more than a public relations 
exercise which is inconvenient but necessary” (p. 111). As a result, they do not take full 
advantage of the opportunities offered in the more entrepreneurial environment only going 
through the motions, making small gestures that failed to amount to more than business as 
usual. 
Trading Zones: The Terms of Exchange 
As I stated at the beginning of the chapter, following the ITI’s Industrial Advisory 
Board meeting the ITI’s research directors found themselves locked into a holding pattern—
they disagreed on how to build the “bridge” over the valley of death. The “bridge” meant 
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different things under Mode 1 and Mode 2. As Burke (1966) said,  “basically, there are two 
kinds of terms: terms that put things together, and terms that take things apart. Otherwise put, 
A can feel himself identified with B, or he can think of himself as disassociated with B” (p. 
49). “Bridge” in the economic development narrative meant something entirely different than 
under the public good narrative. As an internal audience member, several research directors 
seemed to disassociate with the ethos being constructed by the ITI, primarily because they 
saw it as having little value. 
First, several of the research partners saw no need to partner with industry. As Daniel 
said, “most smart people optimize their path to success. Economic development is not part of 
that equation” (interview, April 29, 2008). In his interview, Daniel recognized that once you 
“leave the research realm, you start running out of ways that students can write papers and 
those sorts of things that benefit the students” (interview, April 29, 2008). He described the 
project as an “interesting middle ground” for responding to real needs in the broader societal 
realm as well as the academic realm. Interestingly enough, applied research has occupied that 
middle ground in the linear model since World War II. In this instance, the bridge is not only 
between Mode 1 and Mode 2, but between basic and applied as categories. In his interview, 
John countered the criticism that the proposed platform lacked opportunities for students and 
untenured faculty to get publishable work by saying, “we do it all the time over here [at 
ETAC]” (interview, March 31, 2008). 
Second, there was a certain amount of uncertainty about the role the industry leaders 
should play in the organization. Following the Industrial Advisory board meeting, John told 
me that the problem was in the kind of help the companies needed whether short-term, fee 
for service kind of jobs or longer term partnerships focused on “strategic vision…the big 
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problems, the hard problems that companies don’t have time or resources to work on” —an 
idea “soundly rebuked” by his academic colleagues (interview, March 31, 2008). Identifying 
the role of these industry leaders/advisors became increasingly contentious, particularly in 
relation to the “research” part of the ITI. In his interview, Daniel told me, 
When you talk about the economic development piece, I think that is where 
industry has its strongest say. I think they play much more of a minor advisory 
role when you start to talk about influence. If they want to influence the core 
research, the harsh reality of it is, they need to put the money on the table. If 
they want to see us focus on some research piece that we don’t do now, they 
have to put money on the table. The bottom line is that faculty can’t change 
research areas without some financial support to pay the grad students. But 
their biggest influence would be in the area of where the economic 
development arm of where this goes and again that’s a sort of money talks sort 
of thing also (interview, April 29, 2008). 
As indicated in this quote, ITI directors struggled to find a balance between economic 
development and research arms of the organization, wanting to keep them separate, but at the 
same time recognizing that “money talks”—it has influence.  
But getting industry to participate was also a challenge. For industry, some have said 
its resistance to working with universities is that there is too much risk for the potential return 
on investment (Cohen, 2005). Others point to the perception that universities can’t act fast 
enough (Spielman & von Grebmer, 2006), and still others identified differing incentive 
structures (Davis, 2005), problems associated with intellectual property rights (Grose, 2006), 
or lack of communication among the participants (Spielman & von Grebmer, 2006, p. 299) 
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as reasons to not partner with universities. These responses to the valley of death are further 
complicated by legislation, bureaucratic structures, and differing worldviews about the ways 
in which research “moves” out to practical benefit. As John told me in his interview,  
But everybody struggles with the intellectual property issue and trying to 
define a value for your partners. That’s the real hard part. What’s in it for me 
if I just throw in with you guys, what do I get. That’s hard to articulate; we 
need a value a really distinct value proposition. It’s not a goodwill project. 
We’ve got to be able to appeal to the bean counters (interview, March 31, 
2008). 
Defining the value for the internal and external audiences was the challenge. As Nowotny et 
al. (2001) explained, “the success of these exchanges depends on each participant bringing 
something that is considered valuable by someone else—whatever that value might be. 
Participants usually will return to their ‘home-base’ with their gains, thereby reinforcing in 
typical Mode 2 fashion the links and exchanges that have already occurred by sharing with 
others” (p. 146). As an evolutionary process, Mode 2 makes the first tenuous connections 
between science and society. These connections are the symbolic and concrete spaces where 
potential participants decide on the terms of the trade or transaction. 
But with several directors too intent on protecting their time and resources, the ITI 
became an exercise in boundary work as differentiation rather than integration. The language 
surrounding economic development brought the ITI together, but failed to provide the 
substance needed to keep them there. The body of identifications embodied in narrative 
surrounding the ITI’s version of the “bridge” did not translate to all parties. In their analysis 
of the Museum of Vertebrate Zoology (MVZ), Star and Griesemar (1989) argued that 
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translation or the “process of developing and maintaining coherence across intersecting 
social worlds” (p. 393) is achieved through standardization and boundary objects. They 
claimed that MVZ’s director was successful in bringing together diverse groups including 
university administrators, professors, research scientists, and amateurs for two reasons. First, 
he developed, taught, and enforced a set of methods to “discipline” the information collected 
by expert and non-experts. Through such standardization, the allies could become a part of 
the process in such a way that “their pleasure was not impaired” (p. 407). Second, from these 
standard methods, a series of boundary objects (specimens, field notes, museums, and maps) 
emerged. All of these related to a larger goal that many of the participants shared—to map 
California as a field laboratory. As they said, this goal gave California itself the status of 
boundary object, recognizable and usable in multiple social worlds. 
The story of the MVZ is interesting to the story of the ITI because in many ways, the 
ITI struggled with the standard methods. How could they institute a shared goal? In an 
electronic slide presentation to ISU’s president and provost in October of 2007, just prior to 
the Industrial Advisory Board meeting, John outlined the goal as follows: 
 
 
Where are we going? 
Goal: Build a reputation for being one of the best institutions in the country 
for cyber-enabled discovery & cyber-enabled economic development  
How are we going to do it? 
• Establish industry partners for collaboration and support 
• Establish a strong science-based computer-aided discovery 
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• Significantly increase the funding, infrastructure, and expertise 
• Establish ongoing core funding of $5M/yr within three years through 
university, state, and industry resources 
What does it take? 
• Faculty working as individuals (funding, publications, professional 
activities) 
• Faculty collaborating across discipline boundaries in seeking support 
• Faculty participating in the ITI 
• President and provost buy-in and support 
• College and department leadership and support (electronic slide 
presentation, October 12, 2007) 
Like the MVZ director, John drew on a narrative for a common goal—make ISU the 
best institution in the country. Like the MVZ, it was a goal that was malleable enough to 
intersect several social worlds. In the slides that follow, he furthered that vision by showing 
the ways the various social worlds intersect: some will work on discovery, others on 
economic development; faculty will work as individuals and collaborate across boundaries; 
and it will bridge the industrial and science-based discovery. So why didn’t the narrative 
work? This overarching goal that was guiding the mission and vision statement looked 
adaptable to other local sites. 
Those sites included the university, the state, industry leaders and the research center 
directors who were asked to join. For university leaders, the pressure to show that the state’s 
tax dollars have an impact is great. In an interview, Mark, the science writer, explained it to 
me this way:  
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Part of it is, if ISU can be an engine of economic development, can convince 
state house leaders and the governor that it is an engine of economic 
development, that can lead them to provide more support for ISU. You know, 
graduating 10,000 undergraduates every year may not do it anymore so you 
have to be…we’re doing this other thing, building jobs, building industries 
that weren’t here before (interview, May 19, 2008). 
As Mark’s quote indicates, definitions of the public good for ISU might be changing in light 
of its own audience at the statehouse. When I asked Daniel about the expectation on faculty 
to engage in economic development activities, he exclaimed,  
Oh they’re expecting a lot of that! They expect a lot out of us. But there is a 
disconnect between what the regents say and what the faculty member pays 
attention to. The higher you get up the food chain, the less the faculty member 
will pay attention. What the regents say is absolutely meaningless to most 
people (interview, April 29, 2008). 
Although the expectation is there, getting people to pay attention is another matter. And that 
was the problem for ITI—getting all the research directors to buy into the ITI as a way to 
“build a reputation for being one of the best institutions in the country for cyber-enabled 
discovery & cyber-enabled economic development” (electronic slide presentation, October 7, 
2007). Unlike the MVZ, other boundary objects failed to emerge around which the different 
groups could have coalesced. 
For one, the ITI did not yet stand as an indexed repository that various stakeholders 
can borrow from “for their own purposes ‘without having directly to negotiate differences in 
purpose” (Star & Griesemer, 1989, p. 410). The idea of a repository is somewhat problematic 
 116
for the ITI because unlike the MVZ, its specimens or objects are code. Given the pace of IT, 
this object is much more ephemeral than other objects in a university setting, particularly 
with respect to intellectual property. As John explained in an article in ISU’s College of 
Engineering magazine Innovate, it is “very difficult to protect, to try and quantify what’s 
unique about an algorithm that’s written into software” (p. 8). He continued by saying that 
software is so flexible and fast, its development is about speed and relationships, making the 
dynamic of the organization the selling point or main asset. The ITI’s website was about 
creating and selling that dynamic more than it was about locating and describing a repository 
of ordered objects. And that tension over the purpose of the site seemed to reflect the 
differences among the research directors. As a rhetorical actor, the website seemed to force 
the question: was the ITI a dynamic set of relationships or a repository of knowledge? The 
contentions over the website content had a lot to do with resolving the answer to that 
question. 
In their discussion about Mode 2, Nowotny et al. (2002) stated that identifying 
boundary objects are particularly difficult in Mode 2 because of its diffuse nature. In their 
analysis of projects involving a range of actors from different sectors, they found that the 
projects that had the most success were ones that were strongly contextualized around a 
common goal. For instance, the Central Artery/Tunnel project in Boston was an example of a 
project that was from the outset strongly contextualized. As Nowotny et al. (2002) stated, it 
appeared messy. No single person or agency was in charge and management was inclusive 
and participatory. Second, participation was iterative: “views [were] solicited, advice sought, 
designs modified and then the whole cycle was repeated” (p. 142). Third, all participants 
perceived the outcome as a better approach. This last criterion echoes Galison’s statement 
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that the stability of a trading zone comes from a commitment to the exchange: “They can 
even both understand that the continuation of exchange is a prerequisite to the survival of the 
larger culture of which they are a part” (p. 803). Throughout the process, all parties see the 
value of the working together. This idea of contextualization raises the question of whether 
the ITI might have taken off if its inception had revolved around a specific project or 
technology rather than an idea of how they might approach such a project.  
But, this case study may also indicate that economic development as a key 
justification was not contextualized strongly enough to sustain interest across the 
university/industry divide. As a “bridge” over the valley of death perhaps this narrative and 
its attendant figures are too weakly contextualized for key players to make it their own. At 
the points at which all the stakeholders were in the same room (the Industrial Advisory Board 
meeting), the common goal or organizing vision represented a demarcation rather than an 
integrative exigency. In their work, Wilson and Herndl (2007) found that boundary objects, 
such as knowledge maps, can function to encourage an integrative rather than a demarcation 
exigency. The knowledge maps they discussed made “discordant language and knowledge 
understandable by demonstrating how these ways of thinking and speaking fit within a 
common project and how they emerge from different contexts for action and different 
institutional purposes” (p. 132). This integrative exigency combined with the boundary 
object provided a trading zone, a space for cooperation and exchange among different groups 
with different needs. In the case of the ITI, its available boundary objects were not enough to 
provide a trading zone.  
As Galison (1007) noted, trading zones coordinate symbolic and material actions. For 
disparate groups to work together, it is not a question of getting rid of categories, but of 
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coordinating an approach. But in a trading zone, different traditions meet without losing their 
individuality. Metaphorically, “trading zone” suggests that an exchange takes place—each 
partner brings something of value for exchange. For Nowotny et al. (2001), trading zone are 
“transaction spaces” in which all partners not only bring something for exchange or 
negotiation, but they also take something away as well. For the ITI, this idea of exchange 
never really took hold. In his interview, Daniel reiterated that there is a place for everyone in 
the university: 
We’ve got to help the state and the country. That’s what we are here for. And 
so some people are going to help by doing basic research and others are going 
to, I’ve always argued that there is a place for everybody. We don’t all want to 
look the same. And that’s where the struggle comes in. I wouldn’t expect that 
most of the faculty would want to play in economic development but don’t 
prevent those that do, don’t put up roadblocks for those that do want to do that 
(interview, April 29, 2008). 
In Bourdieu’s terms, Mode 1 and Mode 2 are habitats with different sets of 
dispositions that characterize the habitat and its inhabitants. These differences are marked in 
how speakers use language socially. In other words, business is accomplished and capital is 
converted and transferred by knowing the linguistic market of the receiver. In the case of the 
ITI economic development, did not hold the same value across different markets. And as 
Daniel said, that is where the struggle comes in—we don’t all look the same (interview, April 
29, 2008). Even though the economic development narrative worked well in speaking to its 
external audiences, it distanced its internal audience. As Bourdieu (1991) said, “the 
competence adequate to produce sentences that are likely to be understood may be quite 
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inadequate to produce sentences that are likely to be listened to, likely to be recognized as 
acceptable in all situations in which there is occasion to speak” (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 55). 
Competency in a given linguistic market may not transfer to other social spaces. Being 
listened to is not a matter of grammaticality. It is a matter of competency in a linguistic 
market. In a social space, the dominant competence measures the value of linguistic products, 
functioning as linguistic capital. For Burke (1969b), the difference in competencies is 
rhetoric. “And often we must think of rhetoric not in terms of some one particular address, 
but as a general body of identifications that owe their convincingness much more to trivial 
repetition and dull daily reinforcement than to exceptional rhetorical skill” (p. 1328). In this 
case, the rhetorical actors drew on different linguistic markets with differing valuations on 
the terms of technology transfer. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of this study, when I asked Kay if I could use the ITI as a research 
site, she was really pleased, saying the ITI’s main problem was a lack of communication. 
With my expertise in communication, I could solve the problem. My field notes read:  
Kay thought the study was going to be very interesting and from a practical 
point of view what the ITI needed. She was envisioning a report where in the 
end we could implement a checklist of recommendations and action items. 
And, by the end of the study, we could say done, done, done. She said poor 
communication has been a consistent problem (field notes, January 28, 2008). 
In many ways, Kay’s request reminded me of the checklist in Star and Griesemer’s (1987) 
article about the Museum of Vertebrate Zoology (MVZ). As a boundary object, the checklist 
functioned to maintain coherence across disparate groups of people with different needs and 
interests. From a practical point of view, the checklist made sense for the ITI—it seemed to 
lack a common language to talk about the future direction of the organization. I am not quite 
sure, however, what that checklist would look like. Unlike the MVZ, the ITI had yet to define 
the scope of its work or to identify a project that might stabilize the situation by providing 
points of entry for each participant—what Star and Griesemer (1987) called a means of 
‘translation’ or a common ground in which allies could become a part of the process without 
compromising their interests. In other words, individual needs are not “lost” in translation. 
Participants can “see” how they fit into a larger goal. Although the ITI’s economic 
development narrative translated well to some audiences, it did not with others, specifically 
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several of the research center directors who had been included in the ITI’s administrative 
apparatus. 
In this dissertation, I focused on the key terms or terministic screens that reflect, 
deflect, and select reality (Burke, 1966, p. 45). These terms figure a rhetorical ground or a 
general body of identifications, specifying motives in a field of competing interests. In 
technology transfer, economic development emerged as a new response to the valley of death, 
revising the answer to the central question in technology transfer—for whose benefit? 
Although federal, state, and university leaders have called for new models to increase the 
intellectual interchange between university and industry, several key participants in the ITI 
saw no value in changing the practices that have organized their work. As I think about 
Kay’s request for a kind of checklist, I think about how much of the work the ITI did was 
related to trying to find a ‘middle ground’ for these various interests. The question for me has 
been why wasn’t the rhetorical ground successful? What are the difficulties in ‘bridging’ 
categories such as Mode 1 and Mode 2, basic and applied research, and university and 
business interests? 
These questions are not new and are the subject of many articles and books across 
many fields, including economics, history of technology, public administration, and technical 
communication. But few consider the rhetorical grounds that authorize these various 
discourses as structured practices. To understand key terms as figuring a rhetorical ground, I 
have drawn on Kenneth Burke and Pierre Bourdieu to frame my analysis of the ITI as a fully 
rhetorical discourse, drawing on recurrent social practices that constituted a rhetorical ground 
or space in which value and meaning are constituted and negotiated through principles of 
identification and division.  
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To analyze those principles, I first identified the rhetorical figures used by the ITI and 
the function of those figures. I then analyzed the ways in which its participants interpreted 
those rhetorical figures through the lenses of ethos and audience. In the end, I argued that 
figures are visualization technologies that stabilize the uncertainties in science by providing 
local coordinates for competing groups in complex situations. These coordinates are 
articulated in communication artifacts such as start-up proposals, diagrams, and websites that 
instantiate a vision for mapping relationships and coordinating action—structures for 
thinking through the ITI as a virtual prototype. But as the case of the ITI showed, economic 
development as a visualization technology in Mode 2 worked to bring together different 
groups with different interests, but ultimately failed to hold them there. As Burke (1969b) 
said, “Identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division” (p. 22). 
The specificity of economic development was constructed in opposition to the traditional 
public good model. As a new justification, it failed to provide key participants the means to 
see how they fit into a larger goal without losing their identity. 
Rhetorical Figures: Platforms and Bridges 
Before my study began, I had been leading the marketing team in creating marketing 
materials to announce the new ITI as a “unifying home” and “unique platform” to “bridge” 
the perceived gap between research results and new technologies. In short, the ITI was being 
put forward as a new way to bridge the valley of death. In early 2007, we created a website 
and postcard with plans to do a brochure and newsletter. But in late 2007, following the ITI’s 
first (and only) Industrial Advisory Board meeting, I am told all marketing production was 
put on hold—the organization could not agree on its mission. As Kay explained to me, the 
 123
disagreement was an issue of boundaries: ITI Director John and research center director 
Daniel wanted to push the boundaries of traditional research. In many ways, the purpose of 
the ITI was to establish a kind of trading zone or rhetorical space between Mode 1 and   
Mode 2.  
To understand the conceptualization of the ITI, I analyzed the texts in which John 
was laying out a vision or virtual prototype of the organization: a start-up proposal and white 
paper written for state and university leaders. These texts were the basis for subsequent 
presentations to external audiences and included the website, electronic slide presentations, 
and press releases. In analyzing start-up proposal and white paper, I identified two sets of 
metaphors that described the proposed vision of the ITI: platforms and bridges. In many 
ways, these metaphors were meant to call the organization into being, visualizing the ways in 
which the ITI would unite different actors under a new configuration. In this section, I argued 
that these figures functioned in two ways. First, they provided a structure for thinking 
through the ITI as a virtual prototype. Second, they worked to circumscribe a space for Mode 
2 practices. 
Platforms: The ITI as a Virtual Prototype 
In the start-up proposal and the white paper, the ITI was positioned as a “unifying 
home” and a “unique platform” for science and technology commercialization, extending 
beyond the confines of the university to include industry partners and entrepreneurial start-up 
companies. What made the ITI “unique” was its vision to co-locate, have flexible intellectual 
property relationships, and provide a new mechanism for teaming. Although some may argue 
that these metaphors are more stylistic than substantive, I interpreted their use within an 
historical and cultural context. In many ways, these metaphors functioned to call an audience 
 124
into being—industry leaders. Although the start-up proposal and white paper responded to a 
call by state and university leaders to partner with industry, these documents needed to 
respond to the perceived barriers that make such partnerships difficult. As many have 
discussed in the technology transfer literature, the barriers are many, including legislation, 
resources, and issues with intellectual property. As Kay said in her interview, “in terms of 
economic development, businesses don’t see universities as able to solve real problems in 
real time” (interview, March 17, 2008). These references to “a unifying home” and a “unique 
platform” seemed to be put forward to dispel that perception both in the minds of state and 
university leaders who would give the ITI a start-up grant as well as the industry leaders who 
would be invited to join the ITI. These terms functioned to describe the space, both 
symbolically and physically, helping various participants to think through the ITI as a virtual 
prototype, mapping relationships and creating a “grounds” for action. 
Bridges: Connecting Mode 1 and Mode 2  
In addition, the metaphors in the documents were working to circumscribe a space 
and value for Mode 2 in relation to Mode 1. In my analysis, I found that the narrative in the 
ITI’s texts was firmly embedded in the idea of transfer and “bridging” the valley of death. 
But it revised the metaphors. For instance in the start-up proposal, John summarized the 
outcomes of the ITI as follows: “In short, ITI offers the bridge [italics added] that is currently 
missing between academic IT research that is the engine [italics added] of innovation and 
industry-led commercialization and entrepreneurial activity that is essential for IT-driven 
economic development in the State of Iowa” (start-up proposal, 7/21/2006). This rather 
mechanistic terminology suggests that the problems associated with the valley of death can 
be fixed by building the “missing” link. It also implies a deficiency or lack in the current 
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model, creating an argument by antitheses or a set of oppositions between Mode 2 and Mode 
1: movement and stagnation, applicable and non-applicable results, and the tangible and 
intangible. In essence, the ITI borrowed the metaphors from Mode 1, reactivating their 
meaning by supplying a new result. 
In essence, the concept for the ITI as a “bridge” between academic research and its 
development and commercialization did more than transfer knowledge from one place to the 
next. It revised the boundary lines that had traditionally described academic research by 
defining research in economic development terms. It did so in two ways. First, this shift in 
justification reframed the gaze on the end result: tangible benefits such as numbers of 
licenses, partnerships, and start-up companies. Second, the “bridge” was to be created 
through cooperative action or partnerships that spanned both sides of the valley of death. As 
they were visualizing the institutional structure, however, they were attempting to redefine 
the expert community and the kind of activity in that community. 
 Central to my analysis were the ways the ITI’s identity was structured as difference. 
Drawing on a Burkean framework, I argued that by positioning itself within Mode 2 as a set 
of arguments the ITI’s identity was constituted by what it was not—Mode 1. With economic 
development as Mode 2’s key justification, cooperative action and tangible benefits were 
juxtaposed with Mode 1’s public good model of autonomy and academic freedom. These 
rhetorical figures function as places of identification and division. They are a mutually 
adjusted set of terms that provide local coordinates for participants to “see” how their 
interests fit. Rhetorically, the ITI’s documents were working to create a space in Bourdieu’s 
sense of a set of distinct and co-existing positions defined through relations of order 
(Bourdieu, 1998, p. 8). The ITI had to rhetorically manage those relations of order between 
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Mode 1 and Mode 2 actors, particularly the between space or middle ground. Why did its 
attempt fail to articulate cooperative action? 
Ethos as a Structuring Principle 
In this dissertation, I have argued that rhetorical figures are visualization technologies 
that reflect the structures, rules, and habits of actors situated in systems of practice. In 
attempting to find a middle ground between Mode 1 and Mode 2, the ITI had to negotiate the 
structural resources that organize the systems of practice. To understand the tensions between 
the modes, I drew on the rhetorical concepts of ethos and audience as structural resources. In 
doing so, I defined ethos as an appeal to a set of motives or cultural principles, articulating a 
rhetorical space where communal values and collective acts are interpreted. But following 
Bourdieu’s conditions of reception and production, in which the message is produced in 
relation to a perceived receptivity, this space is also co-constituted by the audience. As I 
noted in Chapter 4, the external representation of the ITI continued to present problems for 
the organization—the research directors had difficulty figuring out what the ITI wanted to be. 
It was in a perpetual identity crisis throughout the time of my study, surviving largely on 
rhetorical hype. At issue was an entrepreneurial ethos that emphasized the industry-side of 
the “bridge” between university and industry. In the interviews, that “bridge” was discussed 
in terms of the “bottom line” and what it would take to make the organization sustainable and 
to get participants to “buy into” the model. 
As I found, the ITI envisioned its audience as an external one—industry partners and 
start-up companies who would provide research dollars via membership and rental income. 
But a second, more internal audience complicated the ITI’s appeal. As a rhetorical appeal, 
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the ITI’s ethos challenged the hierarchical categories instantiated in the traditional linear 
model. Structurally, that model concentrates the locus of scientific authority within academic 
disciplines by asserting that ‘pure’ research is the foundation for innovation and the 
economy’s ability to make technological advances. Nowotny et al. (2001) described such a 
process as follows: 
Scientific literacy (and also perhaps cultural authority) would trickle down to, 
or be imposed upon, the general population with the help of university-
educated school teachers, state officials, members of established professions 
and (more doubtfully) private-sector managers within a framework 
characterized by social and intellectual deference” (p. 81).  
Even if such a linear model were rejected as naïve, the key role of ‘pure’ or disinterested 
science was to contain knowledge production within the walls of the university.  
Under Mode 2, however, that concentration of authority is challenged as more actors 
are invited into the process. As was the case with the ITI, the building it occupied was meant 
to accommodate both university and business leaders in the production of knowledge. By 
transcending university and disciplinary boundaries and expanding the number of actors who 
engage in research, boundaries between what counts as ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the scientific 
community somewhat dissipate. The consequence, Nowotny et al. (2001) noted, is that “the 
university structures of faculties and departments, institutes, and centers that create and 
sustain these communities become less relevant” (p. 89). In the case of the ITI, however, the 
values attached to those structures did not become less relevant. In some ways, they became 
more pronounced and were made manifest in the tension over leadership. As one participant 
stated, several directors felt that John did not have the expertise—publications—to be the 
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director of the institute. As a Mode 2 leader, John was being judged by Mode 1 credentials. 
His ethos was not translating well in the Mode 1 reward system. The problem was how to 
mitigate these value systems. 
But mitigating these value systems was a practical problem. In her interview, Kay 
described the problem by saying that the dissenting research directors simply failed to see the 
benefit—they had no incentive to participate. Others commented on incentives as well, 
saying that such partnerships did not lead to publishable work for graduate students or 
untenured faculty. Furthermore, both Daniel and Mark (the science writer) speculated that the 
problem of getting the dissenting research directors to participate in the model had to do with 
a discomfort with it—they simply had no experience partnering outside academic disciplines. 
As Mark said in his interview, entrepreneurialism is not on their radar at all.  
In the case of the ITI, the research directors struggled to move the organization 
forward and, for the most part, remained a divided group with each side drawing on different 
images of science to promote their authority. As Gieryn (1983) argued, such boundary work 
is a rhetorical style, a set of cultural repertoires that are deployed to advance or protect 
professional authority. There are repertoires for rationalizing public support for science and 
repertoires to discredit other activities as ‘non-science.’ In the case of the ITI, such 
repertoires drew on ethos as a resource for justifying one structure over another and to 
demarcate the lines between basic and applied research and between Mode 1 and Mode 2 
knowledge production. As such, no repertoire is neutral or objective. 
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Audience as a Structuring Principle 
As I argued in Chapter 4, Mode 2 represents a broader engagement with society, 
contextualizing research agendas within larger social systems. As such, audiences such as 
business leaders are called upon to play a different role. In the documents I examined, the 
purpose of the rhetorical devices John used seemed to be to bring this audience forward. As I 
stated earlier, the language surrounding the “bridge” metaphor suggested an antitheses 
between the “old” and “new” ways of working with industry. His goal was to counter the 
perception that universities cannot solve what Kay called “real world problems in real time.” 
In this way, the audience is a co-constituent in the conception of technology transfer. As 
Bourdieu (1991) said, all expressions are marked by an anticipation of what is accepted. The 
audience is embodied in the appeal. 
The rhetorical figures John used when writing the start-up proposal and white paper 
were powerful because they drew on antithesis, a formal pattern that invites audience 
collaboration. As Burke (1969b) said, the form has a certain rhythm with recognizable 
successions of statements: “we do this, but they on the other hand do that; we stay here, but 
they go there; we look up, but they look down” (p. 58). But although the audience may 
surrender to the symmetry, to the rhythm of statements, it may reject the form. The stronger 
the agreement to the succession of statements, the stronger the surrender. For the ITI, the 
succession of statements that gave the organization form failed to hold all the participants 
together.  
When the ITI first received start-up funds, John and Kay recognized the state, 
university, and industry leaders as the primary audience—those who give and those who 
want to give money. From a practical point of view, this focus on this audience made sense. 
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It needed to get into cash flow. The rhetorical exigency was defined in relation to self-
sufficiency and the steps needed to get there. But John also had to define the value for 
industry partners. He was anticipating the response to “what’s in it for me…what do I get” 
(interview, March 31, 2008). As he said, the ITI was not a goodwill project for anyone. In his 
appeal, John conceptualized the “bridge” as both cyber-enabled discovery and cyber-enabled 
economic development. Working together would both broaden the scope of IT research, 
making ISU more competitive for research grants, and address the IT needs of national 
corporation, making them more competitive in the marketplace. In his appeal, he needed to 
rhetorically “bridge” these various interests. 
In the electronic slide presentations that John gave to these external funders, he 
continued to refine the narrative that would serve as a common goal, but the theme was one 
of making ISU a leader in IT research and economic development. And in many ways, it 
worked. The ITI received start-up funds, it had an audience of industry leaders willing to 
serve on its industrial advisory board, and it had many start-up companies located in its 
Technical Collaboration Facility. Its internal audience, however, did not necessarily buy into 
the narrative. Although they understood the succession of statements that were defining the 
ITI, they did not surrender to the symmetry. They failed to see the exchange value.  
In Chapter 4, I concluded by suggesting that one of the reasons the ITI had problems 
communicating was that the economic development narrative of Mode 2 weakly 
contextualized an important constituent. The configuration of its metaphors distanced the 
“basic” research category by de-emphasizing its place as the starting point of knowledge 
production much in the same way the Mode 1 narrative distances the “application” and 
“development” side of the linear progression. How ironic. The Mode 2 narrative as 
 131
exemplified by the ITI was not so much a new model as it was a change in focal point, 
directing the attention on and redefining the role of that audience. The narrative surrounding 
economic development was not enough to contextualize all of the ITI’s constituents. 
Limitations 
Every study has its limitations. As Stake (1994) argued, qualitative research is highly 
personal based on relationships developed in the case and the researcher. In my research, the 
ITI was a local example reinforcing the larger picture in technology transfer. In my analysis, 
I did not seek a one-size-fits all model for thinking about technology transfer and its sets of 
practices. Rather I analyzed one model for the ways in which language constructed the 
discourse of technology transfer as a situated, highly rhetorical activity.  
Given these parameters, my study was limited in a couple of ways. For one, I was not 
able to interview each of the five university research directors that came under the umbrella 
institute. Even though I wanted to do so, I was discouraged by the administrative specialist 
for ETAC and the ITI. At the time of my interviews, relations among the ITI university 
research directors were tense. When I asked the administrative specialist for permission to 
interview these directors, I got the sense that she thought my presence might make the 
situation worse. I had to respect her wishes.  
The data were also limited in that the interviews were interpreted accounts, reflecting 
on the situation, and my analysis is an interpretation of those accounts. These interpretations 
are but one of many possible interpretations of the ITI and the cultural principles that saturate 
its history. Furthermore, the story I told about the ITI was undoubtedly shaped by my own 
experiences and interests. But for any researcher, that shaping is both inescapable and 
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interesting. Without such vested interests, we would all be telling the same story. Clifford 
(1983) argued that the authority of the research has to do with the persuasive power of the 
text to present itself as a valid representation of a culture. My own representation of the ITI is 
most certainly fashioned as a written account. But, we cannot escape our own subjectivities 
and experiences. As Cintron (1997) claimed, ethnographic knowledge is constituted through 
and through by ethos (p. 4). Rather than try to push them aside, these subjectivities make the 
account. In other words, the account is intersubjective or coming out of the dialectical 
activity of ethnographer and participants. “We live in a relational world, not a foundational 
one; hence, reality is not grounded in any particular place but in many places so than an 
ethnographer’s statements have a multiplicity of origins and not a single origin called the 
culture or community ‘under investigation’” (Cintron, 1997, p. 386). The slipperiness of the 
field site and the account of it resist observation as a stable object from within or without. 
Nonetheless, I believe the results of this study have much to offer, particularly at a 
time when public universities are increasingly pressured to partner with industry to research 
and commercialize new technologies. The results should help us begin a critical discussion 
about what we take for granted in technology transfer as a discourse that is by no means 
neutral or without interest. Although many in technology transfer have discussed the 
implications of Mode 2 on university practices, few have considered how Mode 2 fits into the 
discourse as a rhetorical structure for understanding science and technology. After all, Mode 
1 is a fully institutionalized practice, structured by practices closely tied to promotion and 
tenure policies. While many recognize that the primacy of Mode 1, they also foresee Mode 2 
as a sphere of increasing influence. In 2004, Slaughter & Rhoades, (2004) called Mode 2 the 
“new economy” for universities, moving from a public good/learning regime to an academic 
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capitalist knowledge/learning regime (p. 7). But how does such a change in regime take 
place? Who or what authorizes the grounds of such a transformation? Although Gibbons et 
al. (1994) and others praise Mode 2 for its seeming transparency in including more actors in 
the process, this case study shows that such transparency is not without interest. Furthermore 
the tensions the ITI faced raise important questions about models that value partnerships with 
actors who have different and even antithetical goals and objectives. What happens to our 
ideas about creativity and exploration? Can a middle ground be negotiated? 
Future Work 
In the future, I plan to continue to study local instances of technology transfer. As 
Stephen Doheny-Farina (1992) argued in his book Rhetoric, Innovation, Technology, 
technology transfer is highly rhetorical and contingent on the experiences and worldview of 
those involved (p. 7). Case studies, or slices of experiences, give us a way to frame research 
questions that come from praxis or doing. Praxis is what Lather (1991) called the creative 
activity through which we make the world: “through dialogue and reflexivity, design, data 
and theory emerge, with data being recognized as generated from people in a relationship” 
(p. 72). From these relationships, researchers can begin asking questions about what the work 
is doing. The following are three areas of research that I see as important trends in 
technology transfer:  
University partnerships. At the time of my study, the university institute in my case 
study was a “virtual” construct in the process of developing a research agenda and suite of 
services for potential industry partners and entrepreneurial start-up companies—no 
intellectual property exchanged hands, no technologies were involved. Although this case 
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study has implications for the ways in which technology transfer is conceptualized, future 
work might include case studies of university institutes/research centers at different stages of 
development. Questions might include:  
• How do these organizations differ in the ways they define technology transfer?  
• Are the rhetorical figures changing? 
• Are there certain patterns and variables for articulating technology transfer to 
various stakeholders?  
Such an analysis can point to how such local instances fit into larger sets of practices in the 
field as whole. Furthermore, I am curious about whether “economic development” will 
continue to organize discussions about Mode 2. As I have argued, this metaphor focuses on 
an end result in the linear model. My question is whether a new metaphor will emerge to 
reflect the more networked and diffuse practices of Mode 2 knowledge production.  
Pedagogical concerns. Technology transfer is about people interacting in 
relationships and the communication strategies used to negotiate and renegotiate those 
relationships. In their publication called The Engineer of 2020: Visions of Engineering in the 
New Century, the National Academy of Engineering (2004) discussed the various contexts of 
engineering practice and the need to engage multiple stakeholders, including interdisciplinary 
and globally diverse team members, public officials, and a global customer base. They noted 
“good engineering will require good communication,” stating that the increased imperative 
for accountability necessitates an “ability to communicate convincingly and to shape the 
opinions of other engineers and the public” (p. 55). In such publications, the engineering 
field recognizes the need for effective communication strategies across spheres of activity, 
not only as a functional skill but as a tactical one as well. 
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Since 2000, the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) has 
outlined a broad range of student outcomes. To receive accreditation, colleges and 
universities offering degree programs in engineering, computing, technology, and applied 
science must document that they have met these standards. The following criteria include 
skills related to teaching technical and professional communication: 
(a) an ability to apply knowledge of mathematics, science, and engineering   
(b) an ability to design and conduct experiments, as well as to analyze and interpret 
data   
(c) an ability to design a system, component, or process to meet desired needs within 
realistic constraints such as economic, environmental, social, political, ethical, 
health and safety, manufacturability, and sustainability   
(d) an ability to function on multidisciplinary teams [emphasis added] 
(e) an ability to identify, formulate, and solve engineering problems   
(f) an understanding of professional and ethical responsibility 
(g) an ability to communicate effectively 
(h) the broad education necessary to understand the impact of engineering 
solutions in a global, economic, environmental, and societal context 
(i) a recognition of the need for, and an ability to engage in life-long learning 
(j) a knowledge of contemporary issues   
(k) an ability to use the techniques, skills, and modern engineering tools necessary for 
engineering practice (ABET, 2008, p. 23).  
Technology transfer in this instance is not only about helping students develop the skills 
needed in their jobs, but also to understand the broader societal context of their work and 
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their ethical responsibilities. Our research tradition in rhetoric and professional 
communication has much to contribute toward a dialogue about ways to achieve these goals. 
In particular, I am interested in technology transfer and technical communication as a set of 
multi-literacies, encompassing functional, rhetorical, and critical literacies—skills students 
need to assess the perspectives and practices in a given situation. As Selber (2004) said, “for 
better or worse, computer environments have become primary spaces where much education 
happens” (p. 3). English studies need to lead the way in conceptualizing student literacy not 
only in functional, but also in rhetorical and critical terms. Case studies in technology 
transfer can lead to increased dialogue about how communication technologies act as 
interfaces for understanding and negotiating meaning, power, and authority.  
Public policy. In September 2008, the IEEE Central Iowa hosted a Washington 
lobbyist at their monthly meeting to discuss public policy, including current legislation in 
Congress about STEM education funding and patent reform, and the ways engineers can 
communicate effectively with elected leaders. This example indicates two trends in 
technology transfer: the need for increased dialogue across the public and private sectors and 
the need to understand the communication strategies needed to engage in that dialogue. 
Although the ITI actors did engage in a dialogue across these sectors, my access was limited 
to mostly reflections about those interactions. In the future, I hope to have the opportunity to 
shift that focal point, to not only see but to also participate more fully in that interaction. 
Specifically, I am interested in these questions: 
• What rhetorical devices are used in the interaction between those in the sciences 
and engineering with governmental agencies? 
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• How does the sciences and engineering understand scientific literacy, particularly 
in relation to ‘outside’ audiences?  
• How are communication technologies used in the dialogue across sectors? 
Because technologies are increasingly embedded in our daily lives, analyzing the rhetorical 
grounds of the intellectual interchange between the sciences and engineering and public 
policy officials can lead to a better understanding of scientific literacy and ways to 
effectively engage in public discourses. 
Implications 
In technology transfer, communication is often pinpointed as the one of the problems 
relating to the valley of death. In technical communication, the question is often one of how 
to make complex information available to different people with different needs. Indeed as 
Coppola (2006) said, “technology transfer and technical communication have been 
intertwined since the time when homo erectus created tools and needed to talk about their 
use” (p. 286). Beginning in the 1990s, however, those interconnections took on a new 
prominence with Williams and Gibson’s (1990) Communication Perspectives in Technology 
Transfer and Doheny Farina’s (1992) Rhetoric, Innovation, Technology. Both understood 
technical communication as highly rhetorical and criticized the limited views of technology 
transfer and the communication environment as one-dimensional—everyone speaks the same 
language and has the same goals. 
In technical communication, that one-dimensional and uni-directional environment is 
epitomized in Shannon and Weaver’s transmission theory of communication and its ‘conduit’ 
metaphors. Their Mathematical Theory of Communications reflected a post-World War II era 
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of rapid growth and production in the United States as well as the increasing importance of 
telecommunication. They theorized that technical writers take information, encode it, and 
then send it to a receiver. Upon receipt, the receiver decodes the information. Like telephone 
lines, however, noise and static can interrupt the information’s transfer. In this 
conceptualization, the quality of the communication is measured by the “clarity” of the 
transmission. As Doheny-Farina (1992) pointed out, this model works to reduce uncertainty 
in technology transfer—all that is needed is the right message encoded with the right symbols 
and delivered with the right capacity of the channel to handle the information.  
As a highly sophisticated rhetorical activity, technology transfer is not one-
dimensional or uni-directional. Rather, it is constituted by competing interests, motives, and 
values. The danger of information transfer models such as Shannon and Weavers is that they 
tend to neutralize the process of negotiated meaning by embedding mistaking meaning as a 
transferable. In 1979, Miller (1979) argued that technical communication is a humanistic 
discipline. But in identifying with this conception, many scholars in technical communication 
have marginalized and dismissed transmission models. As Slack et al. (1993) noted, within 
technical communication, Shannon and Weaver's model for communication “has been 
extensively critiqued and maligned such that it is nearly requisite to begin any introductory 
text on communication theory with an explanation and rejection of it” (15).  
One of the more interesting aspects of my case study was the use of metaphors that 
follow the information transfer model. The participants used the linear model to describe the 
ITI’s goals and purpose to internal and external audiences, building “bridges” to perceived 
“barriers.” As Coppola (2006, 2007) said, the predominant metaphors in technology transfer 
today are “bridges and barriers,” calling for a new metaphor to describe the process. Indeed 
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as Doheny Farina (1992) argued, the key to understanding collaboration is to understand how 
individuals mediate differing worldviews, saying the process is one of “negotiation and 
sharing of perspectives, values, language, knowledge, and so forth. It is not an exchange of 
objectified pieces of information but a development of relationships. Effective collaboration 
is not just shared information; it is shared relationships” (p. 10). But even though many in 
rhetoric and technical communication dismiss linear models of communication, the 
metaphors persist. In my study, I wanted to understand the power of this metaphor to 
organize worlds of action. 
The results of this case study extend the work of Doheny-Farina and Coppola by 
examining the ways in which rhetorical devices, including the linear model, are used as 
visualization technologies for thinking through and stabilizing the relationships that 
constitute the transfer. In this case, the linear model as a rhetorical figure worked to simplify 
a complex situation by providing coordinates that allowed participants to “see” how and 
where they fit. As such, the model embodies a set of arguments. As Miller (1979) said, 
“science understood as argument asks for assent, for an act of will on the part of the 
audience” (p. 616). As rhetorical actors, these figures epitomize habits, rules, and resources, 
articulating an interpretation of the situation and making the abstract concrete. As Longo 
(2007) stated, metaphor “serves as a language tool to help people understand a new 
technology in terms of something that is already known” (p. 253). In this case study, 
rhetorical figures reactivated the technology transfer metaphor by providing markers for 
success at the same time as it constituted a contested ground over the value of those markers 
and its linguistic market. The contest was over the meaning of the metaphor. 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
General Questions 
1. How did you become interested and involved in ITI? 
2. What is the vision of the ITI? 
3. What are the challenges facing the ITI? 
4. What are your goals for the Institute over the next six months? Over the next 5 years? 
5. How is the ITI model the same or different from other research institutes? 
Communication Materials 
1. Who do you see as its audience for its marketing materials? 
2. What is the communication message? 
3. What do you want to see in the mission statement? 
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